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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is to give a broad overview of the right to freedom of commercial 
expression in New Zealand. The paper begins by considering the value of commercial expression 
and both reasons against and in support of restrictions on commercial expression. The right is 
largely unexplored in New Zealand. On the other hand, the courts in Canada and the United 
States have extensively considered freedom of commercial expression. Therefore this paper 
considers overseas jurisprudence in order to determine the preferred approach to be taken in New 
Zealand. The paper then goes on to explore the actual extent that freedom of commercial 
expression is recognised in New Zealand through examining case law, legislation, the vetting 
process required under the Bill of Rights Act (BORA), and self-regulation of the advertising 
industry through the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). The paper asserts that the right to 
freedom of commercial expression in New Zealand is not protected adequately due to a lack of 
in-depth analysis as to whether restrictions on commercial expression are justified in accordance 
with section 5 of the BORA. Moreover, this paper asserts that the ASA and the Advertising 
Standards Complaint Board (ASCB) are subject to the BORA. Therefore the Codes established 
by the ASA and the decisions of the ASCB should be compliant with the BORA. New Zealand 
must strive to recognise that the right to freedom of commercial expression is a fundamental right 
protected under the BORA. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises 16,164 words. 
SUBJECTS 
Freedom of Expression 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Advertising Law 
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I INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread recognition that freedom of expression 1s a 
fundamental 1ight. However, should this right extend to commercial expression?' 
In other words, can commercial entities invoke their rights under the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (BORA)? It may seem artificial that commercial entities can 
invoke freedom of expression to protect their expression, particularly when 
expression is purely commercial. However, such expression is protected by 
section 14 of the BORA. Section 14 does not exclude information from a 
commercial context. Moreover, section 29 of the BORA extends rights to "legal" 
as well as natural persons. Thus commercial entities may legitimately appeal to 
freedom of expression when restrictions are . placed on their ability to 
communicate. 
This paper gives a broad overview of the concept of commercial 
expression and its protection under the right of freedom of expression. Freedom 
of commercial expression is largely unexplored in New Zealand. However, it has 
been dealt with extensively in other jurisdictions. Therefore this paper begins by 
considering United States and Canadian jurisprudence. Their courts and 
academics have looked into the definition of commercial expression , values 
served by commercial expression, both reasons against restrictions and reasons for 
restrictions, and approaches in justifying limitations on commercial expression . 
The paper will then examine the extent that New Zealand cu1Tently recogni ses and 
restricts freedom of commercial expression through case law , legislation , the 
vetting process and self-regulation of the advertising industry. 
The focus of this paper is the expression itself being "commercial" not 
merely the motive. Most commonly, such express ion would involve adverti sing 
for goods and erv1ces. Alternatively, expression merely motivated by a 
commercial motive, is outside the scope of thi s paper. Articles , documentaries, 
books, films and even art could potentially fit within expression that concerns a 
1 "Co mmerc ial express ion·· and "co mmerc ial speech" are used interchangeably throughout thi s 
paper and has the sa me meaning. The latter is generally used in the context of analysing United 
States jurisprudence. The fo rmer is genera lly used in the contex t of New Zealand and Canada. 
commercial motive. The finding of whether expression itself is "commercial" is 
not an easy task, and this will be explored later. The cases and legislation in this 
area mainly concern commercial advertising. Therefore adve11ising will be the 
main focus of this paper. 
II VALUES OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 
There is public interest in communication of information relating to goods 
and services. Legislation in United States which prohibited pharmacists from 
advertising prices of medicines was invalidated in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (Virginia Pharrnacy).
2 
In doing 
so, Blackmun J stated:3 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation 
of our re ources in large measure will be made through numerous private 
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions ... be 
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable. 
Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court has held:4 
Over and above its intrinsic value as expression, commercial expression which 
... protects listeners as well as speakers plays a significant role in enabling 
individuals to make informed economic choices, an important aspect of 
individual self-fulfilment and personal autonomy. 
Commercial expression may have a role in furthering a core value of 
freedom of expression, that of facilitating democracy. 5 Commercial expression 
informs consumers and in doing so supports a free market economy. Much of our 
economic system depends on the free flow of commercial expression. A free 
2 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citi::.ens Consumer Council Inc (Virginia 
Pharmacy) ( 1976) 425 US 748. 
3 Virginia Pharmacy, above n 2,765 Blackmun J. 
4 Ford, . Quebec (1988] 2 SCR 712,767. 
5 See Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speec/1 and Its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The 
Netherlands, 1999) 9, 20. Sadurski examines the core values of freedom of expression. 
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market economy is an aspect of a democratic society.6 Although, it has been 
argued, that democracy can function without a free market economy,7 as the free 
market is only one idea of how goods should be distributed in society.8 
Another perspective 1s that free expression serves the value of self-
govemment, and commercial expression supports a free market economy in which 
assists individuals in the governing of themselves. 
Individual self-fulfilment is another core value of freedom of expression .9 
Commercial expression can indirectly serve individual self-fulfilment. 
Commercial expression performs an important social and educational role as 
informed choice enables consumers to purchase according to their needs and 
wants. Self-fulfilment ensues due to the purchase of the desired goods and 
services. Moreover, interest in commercial speech may be "as keen, if not 
keener" than "interest in the day's most urgent political debate". 10 
It may also directly serve individual self-fulfilment, merely through the 
expression itself. For example, advertising (one form of commercial expression) 
may sometimes be seen as extremely creative pieces of work. Therefore the mere 
expression of such advertising leads to individual self-fulfilment. 
Finally, commercial expression may contribute to the "marketplace of 
ideas" ' 1, through putting information concerning goods and services out into the 
marketplace. 
It is wo11h mentioning that it has been questioned whether adve11ising does 
in fact inform consumers as modem adve11ising campai gns are designed to be 
6 Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985) 50 OR (2d) 11 8. l 34 Ilenry J (dissent): "[ I]n 
a free market eco no my (which is an attribute o f a democrati c soc ietyl. freedom o f communication 
in econo mic affairs is no les~ important to the proper func ti o ning o f ~oc iety than freedom o f 
po liti cal co mmunication". 
7 Andrew Wil son " Ad verti sing and the Charter: Just Do It?" (2000) 9 Dalhousie Journal of Legal 
Studies 302,3 12. 
Re Klein, above n 6, 164 Ca llaghan J (majority). 
9 See Whitney v California ( I 927) 274 US 357 , 375 Brandeis J . ee a lso Sadurski , abo ve n 5, 20. 
10 Virginia Pharmacy, abo ve n 2, 763. 
11 Abrams v Unit ed States ( I 9 I 9) 250 US 616, 630. 
3 
anti-rational. Critics have examined the psychological effects of advertising and 
argue that many advertisements do not inform as to product quality or price. 
12 
However, analysing the psychological aspects and methods of advertising is 
outside the scope of this paper. For our purposes, we proceed on the presumption 
that advettising informs potential consumers. 
III REASONS AGAINST RESTRICTIONS 
This part of the paper summanses the arguments against restricting 
commercial expression. Evidently, there is an overlap between "values of 
commercial expression" and "reasons against restiictions", as the former provides 
for the latter. Therefore the following are additional reasons against restrictions. 
General advertising bans on vices such as alcohol, gambling, and tobacco 
are considered paternalistic. Viewing people as needing protection from 
promotion of such vices presumes that people are unable to make rational 
decisions. This type of paternalism is "incompatible with the faith places in 
public judgment in a democracy". 
13 
Futther such goods and services are legal to provide therefore should be 
legal to promote. That is not to say free reign is given to advertisers to advertise 
however they wish to. Advertisements should be reasonably restricted if they 
mislead, promote unlawful activities, or are socially in-esponsible. 
14 The point is 
that arbitrary comprehensive bans will be hard to justify as reasonable, compared 
with a partial ban. 15 
The proponents of bans are usually motivated by genuine social concerns. 
They believe that a problem in society can be resolved, amongst other things, by 
an adve1tising ban. 16 However this is argued as nonsense as adve1tising bans 
12 See Wil on, above n 7, for an interesting perspective on the effects of advertising. 
13 Selene Mize "The Word Dog Never Bit Anyone: the Tobacco Advertising Ban and Freedom of 
Expression" (1995) 8 Otago Law Review 3,430. 
14 Glen Wiggs "The Right to Advertise" (Unpublished, Wellington, 1994) l ["The Right to 
Advertise"]. 
15 RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (A({orney General) [1995] 3 SCR 199,344 McLachlin J. 
16 "The Right to Advertise", above n 14, 2. 
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cannot remove the social problems. For example, with respect to a ban on liquor 
advertising, it is not the product that is objected to but the misuse of the product. 
The answer is more education and hence more expression. 17 Advertisers should 
ensure that advertisements do not encourage misuse. 
Commercial expression in the form of paid advertising serves freedom of 
expression in that it provides funding for the press. Both broadcasters and the 
print media rely on advertisements to produce revenue. 18 Commercial expression 
aids the provision of non-commercial expression in broadcasts and print articles. 
Any comprehensive restrictions on advertising may have the effect of decreasing 
such valuable non-commercial expression, particularly if a slippery slope begins 
and more product bans are advocated on products such as fast food, cellular 
phones, women's sanitary products and so forth. The potential for advertising 
bans may be endless and the potential for fewer media organisations would ensue. 
IV REASONS FOR RESTRICTIONS 
This part of the paper summanses the arguments for restricting 
commercial expression. 
Edwin Baker argues that "limiting people's opportunity to use legislative 
power to regulate commercial actors, including the actor's speech, out of some 
view that the regulation is not really in the people's interest" 19 is paternalistic. 
This is the idea of judicial paternalism, in that the Cou11 would be paternalistic if 
it protects commercial speech and invalidates rationally designed legislative 
choices. 2° For instance, when there is widespread popular support for bans on 
tobacco advertising, it is paternalistic for the Court to invalidate such regulation 
on the basis that it is not really in the people's interest. 
17 "The Right to Advertise", above n 14. 8. 
18 Colin Munro 'The Value of ommercial Speech" (2003) Cambridge Law Jn! 62(1) 134, 156. 
19 C Edwin Baker "Paternalism. Politics, and Citizen Freedom: the Commercial Speech Quandary 
in Nike" (2004) 54 Case W Res I 161, 1178. 
20 Baker, above n 19, 1178. 
This argument is an interesting twist on the "paternalism" concept, as 
usually "paternalism" is put forward as a reason to support not having 
comprehensive bans on advertising. The key point in response would be that 
people are able to use the legislature to regulate commercial expression, but if 
they do, they must provide evidence to justify such action. 
Furthermore, it is argued that commercial expression 1s not chilled as 
easily. First, due to the profit motive, commercial expression is seen to be more 
durable. 21 However, it is noteworthy that commercial expression is only as: 22
 
[H]ardy as the law empowers it to be, and ... if certain advertising practices are 
prohibited ... and the sanctions sufficiently enforceable, no degree of perceived 
hardiness will enable speech to persevere. 
Secondly, businesses have easier access to the truth regarding their factual 
statements about products and the organisation. In contrast, typical speakers on 
public affairs do not have similar methods to verify their speech.
23 The chilling 
effect is more likely to arise in the latter context. 
One concern is protection of a vulnerable group, such as children or 
consumers m general. Restrictions on commercial expression would be 
reasonable m order to protect children or consumers against unscrupulous 
advertisers, in particular because consumers do not have adequate resources to 
check that information is correct. Therefore advertisements should not be false or 
misleading. Further, advertisers commonly spend large amounts of funds on 
sophisticated advertising campaigns which employ psychological tools so that 
advertisements have the desired persuasive effects. Consumers should be 
protected to an extent due to this imbalance of power that advertisers have. 
Advertisers should have a due sense of social responsibility. However, it does not 
follow that arbitrary wide-reaching bans are reasonable. 
21 Baker, above n 19, 1178. 
22 Rodney Smolla "Free the Fortune 500! The debate over corporate speech and the First 
Amendment" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1277, 1290. 
23 Baker, above n 19, 1169. 
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Some argue that the principal purpose of freedom of expression is to 
advance human autonomy and dignity. Thus as commercial entities are non-
human there is a lack of human dignity to protect. 24 This is argument seems 
persuasive in the first instance as when one thinks of breaches of "fundamental 
rights", the right of a tobacco company to advertise cigarettes does not jump to the 
fore-front of one's mind. Moreover, breach of a tobacco company's right to 
advertise, hardly pulls at the heart strings as other breaches of fundamental rights 
tend to do. 
Yet this argument largely ignores the fact that section 29 of the BORA 
expressly provides that rights extend to legal persons as well as natural persons. 
Therefore it is irrelevant that such entities are non-human. 
It has been suggested that due to some positive protection of commercial 
expression, such as through company law, partnership law, and intellectual 
property law, then the negative effect of advertising restrictions " may be thought 
to redress the balance somewhat".25 However, this perspective is illogical. An 
analogy in the political sphere may demonstrate the absurdity. For example, in 
allowing citizens the right to vote for a government, it does not follow that it is 
justified to restrict the right to protest about the government. The giving of 
positive protection for some commercial expression should not provide the 
justification for restricting other commercial expression. Any justification must 
relate to the advertising itself. 
Perhaps if freedom of commercial expression is indeed an artificial appeal 
to freedom of expression by commercial entities , then it may serve to water down 
the right. It may have the effect of lessening the authority for the fundamental 
right to freedom of expression. 
24 Baker. above n 19 , 1163. 
25 Munro. above n 18, 145 . 
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V DEFINING COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 
The First Amendment26 guarantees freedom of expression in the United 
States. The United States Constitution lacks an express provision to justify 
limiting the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. Instead, the 
courts have established categories of speech and afford each category different 
levels of protection. It has developed its commercial speech doctrine, which gives 
the category of "commercial speech" an intermediate level of protection 27 under 
the First Amendment. Therefore it is essential to define what commercial speech 
1s. However, the United States jurisprudence has shown that it is difficult to 
define precisely what constitutes "commercial speech". It has offered various 
definitions that commentators have argued are unworkable and unpredictable. 28 
In comparison, Canada does not categorise speech as such. Freedom of 
expression is protected under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982 (Cha11er). In Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attomey-General),29 the 
Supreme Court held that "if the activity conveys or attempts to convey meaning, it 
has expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee". 
The only exception was that violence was not a form of expression. This is a very 
broad definition of "expression", thus all expression including commercial 
expression is protected under this definition. 
There is less need for categorisation as the Charter provides an express 
limitation in section 1. Rights and freedoms are subject to "such reasonable 
limits presc1ibed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". This limitation allows the Canadian Courts to balance guaranteed rights 
26 US Constitution, amendment I. 
27 
See Central H11dso11 Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Co111111issio11 of New York ( 1980) 447 
US 557. Commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny, compared with non-commercial 
speech which is usually subject to trict scrutiny. See al o Sadurski, above n 5, 37-43, for a 
summary of levels of scrutiny. 
28 
See Deborah La Fetra "Kick it up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial 
Speech" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1205 . See also Elliot Dozier "The Effect of the Commercial 
Speech Classification on Corporate Statements" (2004) 33 Stetson L Rev 1035 . 
29 
/ rwi11 Toy Ltd v Quebec ( Attomey-Genera/) [ 1989] l SCR 927. 
8 
against other interests without restricting the substantive scope of the Charter 
provisions. 30 
The Canadian Supreme Court noted that although certain speech could be 
appropriately described as "commercial expression", the term had no particular 
meaning or significance under the Charter. 31 Thus what can be termed 
commercial speech is protected from the outset under section 2(b)32 of the Charter 
and avoids the definitional problems that affect United States case law. 
A United States Definitions 
1 Not all paid advertising is commercial speech 
Commercial speech lacks a reliable definition ever since it was first 
recognised as falling within First Amendment protection in 1976. 33 What is 
reasonably certain is the outcome of easy cases. 34 
At one end, not all paid advertising is properly classified as "commercial 
speech". The Supreme Court held in New York Times v Sullivan 35 that an 
advertisement which protested against handling of civil rights demonstrations , 
was one that: 36 
[C]ommunicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested 
claimed abuses. and sought financial support on behalf of those whose existence 
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. 
Therefore it was not treated as commercial speech. 
30 See Christopher Manfredi "The Canadian Supreme Court and American Judicial Review: 
United States Constitutional Juri sp rudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 
(1992) 40 AM J COMP J 2 13. 
31 Ford v Quebec. above n 4. 755. 
32 Section 2(b) provides: ··Everyone has the following freedom : ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression. including freedom of the press and other media of communication". 33 Virginia Pharmacy, above n 2. 
34 Robert O'Neil·· ih.e v Kasky- What Might Have Been .. (2004) 54 Case W Res 1259, 1262 35 New York Times 1• Sullivan ( 1964) 376 US 254. 
36 New York Tim es 1• Sullivan. above n 35, 266. 
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2 Speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction 
At the other end, in Virginia Pharmacy, a publication which "does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction"37 seeking solely to promote a sale of 
a good or service, is commercial speech. For instance such speech would involve 
the traditional advertising of an offer to sell antibiotics at a set price. 
However, with the sophistication and innovation of marketing methods 
that exist today, it is difficult to determine whether such expression would be 
doing "no more" than proposing a commercial transaction. Brown J in the 
California Supreme Court dissented in Kasky v Nike38 . She argued contemporary 
marketing involves speech that is very much intermingled: 39 
[W]ith the growth of commercialism, the politicization of commercial interests, 
and the increasing sophistication of commercial advertising over the past 
century, the gap between commercial and non-commercial is rapidly shrinking. 
As it is difficult to articulate a clear dividing line delineating such 
innovative methods, any attempt to characte1ise may be arbitrary and inconsistent. 
3 Expression related solely to economic interests of speaker and audience 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New 
York (Central Hudson/0 defined commercial speech as "expression related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience". 41 However, the 
Supreme Court has recognised that speech can serve dual functions. 42 There is 
potential that speech that is in some sense "commercial" may also be part of a 
matter of public interest. For instance, in Kasky v Nike, Nike published corporate 
37 Virginia Pharmacy, above n 2, 762. 
38 Kasky v Nike Inc (2002) 45 P 3d 243. 
39 Kasky 1• Nike, above n 38, 326-7 (Brown J). See also Deborah La Fetra , "Kick it up a Notch: 
First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1205, 1231-1236. 
She suggests that a wide variety of marketing methods that differ from traditional advertising 
including product placements, sponsorship. , testimonials, music videos, virtual advertising, 
guerrilla marketing and providing helpful advice. 
4° Central Hudson v New York, above n 27. 
41 Central Hudson v New York, above n 27. 561. 
42 See Colten v California (1971) 403 US 15. 26. 
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statements regarding its labour practices in Asia. It was held to be "commercial 
speech" by the majo1ity, yet it was not solely concerning the economic interests of 
Nike. Such speech concerned Nike's corporate image and ethical reputation. It 
was speech on a matter of public concern thus had political implications not 
"solely" related to economic interests. 
Another example concerns advertising for abortion. The information may 
be commercial in nature as clinics operate as a business. Yet, the implications of 
the advertising are of public concern in that the morality of abortions is a matter 
of public debate .43 
Speech may have artistic and creative elements as well as commercial 
elements. Advertising such as classified advertisements in a newspaper column 
may not be seen to have artistic merit.44 However, can the same be said of the 
sophisticated advertisements we see on billboards and television? Given the 
amount of money invested in marketing campaigns, the results frequently do 
represent creative endeavours. 
4 Three factors in Bolger v Youngs Drug Corp 
In Bolger v Youngs Drug Corp (Bolger)45 the Supreme Court found three 
factors indicated whether speech was commercial. First, the speech was in 
advertising format. Secondly, it referenced a specific product. Thirdly, the 
speaker had economic motivation for making the statements. 46 Each factor in 
isolation was insufficient to tum statements into commercial speech, whereas the 
combination of all factors strongly supported characterising the speech as 
commercial.47 In Bolger, the speech at issue was informational pamphlets about 
contraception , which contained only passing references to a brand of condom. 
The Supreme Court determined that it was commercial speech. Arguabl y, it 
should have been speech on a matter of public concern. Fu1ther, informati onal 
43 See Bigelow" Virginia ( 1975) 421 US 809, where a statute which prohibited promoti on of 
abortions was held to violate the First Amendment. 
44 See Munro, above n 18, 150. 
45 Bolger v Youngs Drug Corp ( 1983) 463 US 60. 
46 Bolger v Youngs Dru(? Corp, above n 45, 66-67. 
47 Bolger v Youn f?S Dru(? Corp, above n 45, 67. 
l l 
pamphlets do not necessarily parallel traditional advertising format. Moreover, 
references to a specific product surely should amount to more than mere passing 
references. 
However, Bolger stated that "advertising which 'links a product to a 
current public debate' is not thereby entitled to constitutional protection afforded 
non-commercial speech". 48 This qualification was added to prevent businesses 
from deviously attempting to gain non-commercial speech protection by attaching 
a matter of public concern to advertisements.49 
However, sometimes speech is "inextricably intertwined" with speech of 
public concern and it is not a devious attempt to gain protection, but genuine 
speech that should be afforded greater protection. The Supreme Court has 
reasoned that assuming speech was commercial, it does not retain "its commercial 
character when it was inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected 
speech".50 
Brown J dissents in Kasky v Nike and observes that "Nike's speech is more 
like non-commercial speech than commercial speech because its commercial 
elements are inextricably intertwined with its non-commercial elements".51 The 
commercial elements, being references to Nike's own factory conditions in Asia, 
were inseparable from Nike's comments on globalisation and labour practices. 
Many commentators have argued the majority in Kasky v Nike were incorrect to 
have held Nike's speech was commercial.52 
48 Bolger v Youngs Drug Corp, above n 45, 68. 
49 See Valentine v Chrestensen (1942) 316 US 52, where an advertisement for submarine tours was 
on one side of a handbill, with a protest on the other side. 
50 Riley, District Attorney v National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina Inc (1988) 487 US 
781,796. 
51 Kasky v Nike, above n 38, 274 Brown J (dissent). 
52 See Deborah La Fetra "Kick it up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial 
Speech" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1205. See also Elliot Dozier "The Effect of the Commercial 
Speech Classification on Corporate Statements" (2004) 33 Stetson L Rev 1035. See also Bruce 
Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher "Why Format, not Content, is the Key to Identifying Commercial 
Speech" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1243. See al o O'Neil, above n 34. 
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B Summary of Definitions 
Efforts to define commercial speech have been criticised by subsequent 
cases and commentators alike. It is difficult to define as speech can serve many 
interests. Also sophisticated marketing methods make it more difficult to 
articulate a workable definition. There will be situations where speech should in 
substance be included as commercial speech, yet may not as it fails to fit within 
the commercial speech definition. For example, guerrilla marketing techniques do 
not fit within the "advertising format" requirement of Bolger. Conversely, there 
will be situations in which the speech in substance is not commercial speech and 
yet is included in the definition , such as speech by a commercial speaker on a 
matter of public debate. 53 Yet, due to the lower level of protection afforded to 
commercial speech in the United States, it is a necessary task to determine what 
constitutes commercial speech. The Supreme Court recently had the chance to re-
examine the commercial speech definition and category, as it initially agreed to 
review the Kasky v Nike decision . 54 However, after full briefing and oral 
argument the Court dismissed the case as "improvidently granted" ,55 thus chose 
not to decide, much to the disappointment of many academics. 
In contrast, Canadian courts do not afford lower level protection to 
commercial speech at the outset. However, restrictions can still be justified if 
section 1 of the Charter is satisfied. This avoids much of the definitional dramas 
that occur in the United States. However, in Canada, it has been acknowledged 
that restrictions on commercial expression may be easier to justify than 
restrictions on other types of speech. 56 This may suggest that Canada may 
nevertheless have to inquire into some sort of definition for commercial 
expression if indeed it is easier to justify. Yet the Canadian courts avoid defining 
the term, because it is unnecessary. The Canadian approach allows for a 
balancing approach for the circumstances in each case. The balancing approach 
51 See Kasky v Nike, above n 38. 
54 See Nike v Kasky (2003) 537 US 1099. 
55 See Nike v Kasky (2003) 539 US 654. 
56 RJR-MacDonald v Canada , above n 15. 348 McLachlin J. 
does not tum on the definition as it does so in the United States. This point is 
further explained at a later point in this paper.57 
VI JUSTIFIED LIMITATIONS 
A United States 
Once speech has been categorised as "commercial speech", then 
intermediate scrutiny applies to such speech. 58 This is in contrast to non-
commercial speech, for instance political speech, which strict scrutiny applies. In 
the case of strict scrutiny, Courts scrutinise any restrictions much more rigorously 
than in the case of intermediate scrutiny. 
In Central Hudson, a four-step test was developed that provided the 
process for intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech. This is consistent with 
the speech's "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values".59 
First, speech must be within the protection of the First Amendment. 
Commercial speech which advertised unlawful activity or was false or misleading 
was not protected. This is significant, as other speech, such as political speech is 
protected even if false or misleading. Thus commercial speech is singled out. 
Secondly, there must be a substantial governmental interest in restricting the 
speech. Thirdly, the restriction must directly advance the governmental interest 
asserted. Finally, the restriction must not be more than necessary to serve that 
interest.60 The last step was further defined later to require a "reasonable fit" as 
opposed to the "least restrictive means". 61 
The Supreme Court has applied this test and invalidated vanous state 
restrictions including restrictions on professional legal advertising, 62 
57 See Part VIC Comparing Approaches. 
58 Central Hudson v New York, above n 27. 
59 Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association (1978) 436 US 447 . 456. 
60 Central Hudson v New York, above n 27, 565-566. 
61 Board of Trustees of Stare Unil'ersity of New York v Fox ( 1989) 492 US 469, 479. 
62 Bates v Srare Bar of Ari-.:.ona ( 1977) 433 US 350. 
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advertisements for electricity supply, 63 use of news-racks to distribute 
"commercial handbills" while permitting use of news-racks for newspapers, 64 
prices of alcoholic beverages, 65 disclosure of beer strengths, 66 and outdoor 
billboards for tobacco. 67 The restrictions usually satisfy substantial government 
objectives, yet fail on the fourth step. Restrictions have been too broad when 
other alternatives are available that would be less detrimental to freedom of 
speech. 
However, it appears the Supreme Court is ready to uphold restrictions 
when there is a vulnerable group to protect. The Court has upheld restrictions on 
personal solicitation by professionals68 due to inherent dangers of fraud, undue 
influence, and intimidation. In one case the Court upheld a rule that banned 
professionals targeting accident and disaster victims soon after the event, due to 
the special vulnerability of the victims.69 Additionally, protecting children is a 
common asserted justification for restricting speech. The Cou1t of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a restriction on outdoor advertising of alcohol and tobacco 
due to the state interest of promoting "welfare and temperance" of children.70 
The recent controversial case Kasky v Nike concerned misleading 
statements about labour practices. Due to the "commercial speech" classification, 
Nike's speech was subjected to the Central Hudson test. Given the speech was 
misleading, application of the first step of the test meant that Nike's speech was 
not protected under the First Amendment. The core issue was that had the speech 
been defined as "non-commercial speech" or "inextricable intertwined speech", 
and elevated to strict scrutiny, then most likely the competition laws, that Nike 's 
speech was penalised under, would have been invalidated. This is because the 
Court's treatment of false or misleading non-commercial speech differs in that 
63 Central Hudson v New York, above n 27. 
64 Cincinatti v Discovery Network ( 1993) 507 US 410. 
65 44 Liq11on11art Inc v Rhode Island ( 1996) 517 US 484. 
66 Rubin v Coors (1995) 514 US 476. 
67 Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly, A-G of Mas.\(/c/zusetts (2001 ) 533 US 525. 68 See Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, above n 59. 
69 See Florida Bar v Went For It Inc (1995) 515 US 618. 
70 Anheuser-Busch v Sch111oke (/997) 101 F 3d 325. llowever, it is likely that since Lorillard 
Tobacco Co v Reilly, if a similar case arose. it may be decided in favour of freedom o f commercial 
expression. 
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"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to 
survive"'.71 
In Nike v Kasky, the statements were made through the media and in the 
context of a fast-moving public debate in which Nike had to respond immediately. 
This differs from the unlimited timeframe that Nike may have to devise a hard-
sell advertising campaign for shoes. 72 It is strongly arguable however, that the 
former should be protected even if misleading, the media is likely to reveal any 
misleading statements. In contrast, the latter should not be protected if 
misleading, due to the consumer's inability to reflect on or check the information 
before engaging in economic transactions.73 Moreover, the media is more prone 
to analysing expression in the political arena and commercial advertising is not 
commonly scrutinised to a similar extent. 
B Canada 
Canadian Courts justify limitations using section l of the Charter. In R v 
Oakes 74 , the Supreme Court set out guidelines for determining whether a 
limitation was justified under section l. The government has the burden of 
provmg, on the balance of probabilities, that the limitation was "demonstrably 
justified". 
First, the objective must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding 
a constitutional right. Secondly, the measures chosen must be proportional. In 
determining propo1tionality, the Court must consider whether the measures 
chosen are rationally connected to the objective; whether the measures impair the 
guaranteed right as little as possible; and whether there is proportionality between 
the deleterious effects of the measures and their salutary effects.75 
71 New York Ti111es v Sullivan, above n 35, 271-2. 
72 Bruce Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher "Why Format, not Content, is the Key to Identifying 
Commercial Speech" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1243, 1252. 
73 See Johnson and Fisher, above n 72, 1250-1255. 
74 R v Oakes (1986] l SCR 103. 
75 The Oakes test as restated in R v Edwards Books & Art Ltd [ 1986] 2 SCR 713, 768-69. 
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The Canadian Supreme Court has similarly invalidated state restrictions 
including restrictions on English signs in Quebec, 76 tobacco advertising, 77 and 
professional advertising of dental services,78 and signs with trade names outside 
the industrial zone.79 
Again, the sufficiently pressing objective requirement is usually satisfied. 
Most restrictions fail in that they are not proportional. For instance, in RJR-
MacDonald v Canada (RJR-MacDonald;8° a total ban on tobacco advertising was 
found to be too broad and the government had not proven that a partial ban on 
"lifestyle advertising" would not be sufficient to meet the objective of 
discouraging smoking. 81 
However, the Supreme Court upheld a restriction when the objective was 
the protection of children. The case concerned a prohibition against advertising 
directed at children under the age of thirteen. 82 Therefore it appears that the Court 
can justify restrictions in order to protect a vulnerable group. 
If Kasky v Nike had occurred in Canada, the Court in applying the Oakes 
test may have found that the law was disproportionate. The competition law that 
imposed strict liability may have been too detrimental to Nike's right to speak, 
thus invalidated. 83 This analysis would occur without having to characterise the 
speech as "commercial". The difference is misleading speech is not within the 
Central Hudson test, whereas it is clearly "expression" under section 2(b) of the 
Charter. Therefore analysis of the restriction can proceed in the latter approach 
but not the former. 
76 Ford v Quebec, above n 4. 
77 RJR-MacD011ald Inc v Ca11ada, above n 15 . 
78 Rocket v Roya l College of De111al Surgeons of Ontario [ 1990] '2 S R 232. 
79 R v G11ig11ard (2000] 1 SCR 472. 
80 RJR-MacD011ald Inc v Canada, above n 15 . 
81 RJR-MacD011ald \I Canada, above n 15, 347 McLachlin J. 
82 Irwin Toy v Quebec, above n 29. 
83 Karla Gower "Looking Northward: Canada's Approach to Commercial Expression" (2005) lO 
Comm L & Pol 'y 29, 61. 
17 
I Deference 
The Canadian Supreme Court has acknowledged that restrictions on 
commercial expression may be easier to justify than restrictions on other types of 
speech. 84 This essentially means there is lower scrutiny of the restrictions on 
commercial expression. However, this finding does not tum on the motive of the 
speaker. A "profit-motive" is irrelevant to whether the government has 
established that a law is reasonable or justified.85 
The reason why restrictions on commercial expression are easier to justify 
is essentially an act of deference to Parliament. It has been suggested that greater 
deference to Parliament may be approp1iate if the law is concerned with 
competing rights between different sectors of society. 86 This deference is justified 
on the basis that commercial speech cases usually involve policy matters, where 
the legislature has attempted to protect a vulnerable group, for example children, 
or balanced the interests of two competing groups, for example businesses and 
consumers. 87 The legislature has access to resources and processes for 
consideration of all supporting and opposing views, and has the ability to debate 
such policy matters. La Forest J illustrates this point in his dissent in RJR-
MacDonald: 88 
Courts are specialists in the protection of liberty and are, accordingly, well 
placed to subject criminal justice legislation to careful scrutiny. However, courts 
are not specialists in the realm of policy-making, nor should they be. 
However, McLachlin J, in the majority, in RJR-MacDonald cautions that 
"deference must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the 
burden ... of demonstrating that the limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are 
reasonable and justified". 89 This is the crucial point: limits on commercial 
expression may be easier to justify, but the government must still bring forward 
84 RJR-MacD011ald v Canada, above n 15 , 348 McLachlin J. 
85 RJR-MacDonald v Canada, above n 15, 348 McLachlin J. 
86 Irwin Toy v Quebec, above n 29, 993-4. 
87 Gower, above n 83, 59. 
88 RJR-MacDonald v Canada, above n 15 ,277 La Forest J (dissent). 
89 RJR-MacD011a/d v Canada, above n 15. 332 McLachlin J. 
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evidence and show that the limitation is rationally connected, minimally impairs 
the right, and is proportional. 
In examining the evidence brought forward, the courts may give greater 
deference to Parliament. For example, in Irwin Toy v Quebec, evidence indicated 
that children under the age of six were unable to distinguish fact from fiction, but 
at some stage between seven and thirteen they become capable of understanding 
advertisements. A majority of the Court accepted Parliament's decision to impose 
the upper age limit of 13 as opposed to a younger age. It held that the government 
should be afforded a "margin of appreciation to form legitimate objectives based 
on somewhat inconclusive social science evidence".90 
The specific weighting of what a government must establish to warrant a 
finding of a "reasonable limitation" depends on the consumer group being 
protected and the extent of harm that advertising can cause to that group. 91 
C Comparing Approaches 
In comparing the two approaches, the Central Hudson test is very similar 
to the Oakes test. However, the balancing occurs at a different location.92 It is 
arguable that the Canadian Courts similarly engage in a categorisation process, 
due to the acknowledgment that restrictions on "commercial expression" may be 
easier to justify than restrictions on other types of speech. Yet this 
"categorisation" is done under section l rather than section 2(b) of the Charter. 93 
Karla Gower argues that location matters for three reasons. First, 
acknowledgement that speech is protected at outset avoids definitions of 
categories, which is arbitrary and difficult. 94 
Secondly, the principle of freedom of expression is preserved as it does 
not create a hierarchy of speech in contrast to the First Amendment.95 Although it 
90 Irwin Toy v Quebec, above n 29, 990. 
91 Gower, above n 83, 59. 
92 Gower, above n 83, 58. 
91 Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
94 Gower, above n 83, 59. 
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is arguable , if some restrictions on certain "expression" are easier to justify than 
others then arguably in substance a "hierarchy" does exist. However, there is no 
hierarchy at the outset, which may serve to strengthen the principle of freedom of 
expression. 
Thirdly, it permits the "right" to be balanced against the "regulation" in a 
more substantive way. 96 Instead of arbitrary distinctions at the outset, all 
expression is included and then subject to the section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 
is "an exercise based on the facts of the law at issue and the proof offered of its 
justification, not on abstractions" .97 This allows for greater balancing of rights 
and restrictions, which takes into account the contextual circumstances of 
individual cases. 
It seems arguable that Canadian courts similarly must inquire into some 
form of a definition for commercial expression due to the acknowledgment that 
commercial expression is easier to justify. However, the Canadian courts do not 
need a determinative definition precisely due to its ability to balance the right and 
limitation within the circumstances of each case. It appears that a common-sense 
approach is taken as to what constitutes commercial expression , and the cases that 
have reached the Supreme Court to date have clearly concerned commercial 
expression . 98 Pure commercial expression may be more easily justified. 
However, expression which may not be purely commercial expression may be 
harder to justify. There is no need for a determinative definition as the balancing 
approach in Canada does not tum on the definition as it does in the United States. 
It is questionable whether there are any real differences in results between 
the two approaches . If we examine the track record for both the courts we can see 
that the rate of upholding restrictions is relatively similar. In the United States, as 
David Vladeck observes , since Virginia Phannacy was decided in 1976, there 
have been twenty four core commercial speech cases decided in the Supreme 
95 Go wer, above n 83, 59. 
96 Gower, above n 83, 59. 
97 RJR-MacDonald v Canada, above n 15 , 33 1 McLachlin J. 
98 See Ford v Quebec, above n 4; Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, above n 29; Rocket v Royal College of 
Dental Surgeons of Ontario, above n 78; RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada, above n 15 ; R v 
Guignard, above n 79. 
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Court. 
99 
In only five cases were the restraints upheld. 100 By companson m 
Canada, since the Charter came into force in 1982, only five commercial 
expression cases have come before the Canadian Supreme Court. 101 The Supreme 
Court only upheld the restriction in Irwin Toy v Quebec. Thus both ju1isdictions 
have an upholding rate of 20 per cent. 
Obviously these findings are not definitive, but they are interesting to see 
that the results seem to be somewhat similar. In particular, as mentioned earlier, 
the cases that have upheld restrictions, usually concern protecting vulnerable 
groups. More significantly, these findings show that commercial expression is 
being firmly protected in both jurisdictions. 
VII NEWZEALAND 
As already observed, the concept of "freedom of commercial expression" 
is largely unexplored in New Zealand. Therefore, New Zealand is likely to look 
to judicial decisions in other jurisdictions. Such authority is not binding on the 
courts in New Zealand. Despite this, such decisions will be highly persuasive as 
they offer both extensive legal analysis as to the values of commercial expression, 
and thorough frameworks to apply in determining whether a restriction on 
commercial expression is justified. Such justifications and frameworks can have 
universal application, especially in exemplifying a universal character to human 
rights. 102 
However, it is impo1tant to acknowledge that New Zealand may have 
different histo1ical and social circumstances, and thus care needs to be taken when 
adopting comparative case law. Moreover, it is especially significant that the 
99 
David Vladcck "Nike v Kasky and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine: Lessons from a 
Story Untold" (2004) 54 Case W Res 1049, 1067-8. 
100 
Sec 0/zra/ik ,, Ohio State Bar Association, above n 59; Friedman v Rogers ( 1979) 440 US l; 
Posadas de Peurto Rico Associates v Tourism Co ( l 986) 478 US 328; United States v Edge 
Broadcas1i11g ( 1993) 509 US 418; and Florida Bar, , Went For It, above n 69. 
101 
See Ford, . Quebec, above n 4; Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, above n 29; Rocket v Royal Coffege of 
Dental Sur~eo11.1 of Ontario, above n 78; RJR-MacD011ald Inc v Canada, above n 15; R" 
Guignard, above n 79. 
102 
Paul Ri~hworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 2003) 66. 
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Canadian Charter and the United States Constitution are constitutional documents 
that entrench rights and freedoms. This gives their courts the power to strike 
down legislation. Conversely, in New Zealand, the BORA is not supreme law and 
nor do our courts have the power to strike down legislation. 
New Zealand is likely to follow the Canadian approach as the BORA 
draws heavily on the Canadian Charter. 103 However, it is worth mentioning that 
in tum, Canadian jurisprudence drew on First Amendment jurisprudence m 
developing their approach to commercial expression in the Charter. 104 
First, it is necessary to examine the BORA framework. Secondly, New 
Zealand case law will be examined and the extent, if any, it has given to the 
recognition of commercial expression. Thirdly, New Zealand legislation will be 
examined for current breaches of freedom of commercial expression. Fourthly, 
the Attorney-General's duty to report on BORA inconsistencies 105 shall be 
examined; and finally, in order to give a complete picture, it is necessary to 
examine the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) and its role in regulating 
commercial expression. 
VIII BILL OF RIGHTS ACT FRAMEWORK 
Freedom of expression is protected under section 14 of the BORA which 
provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
Of particular significance is that the right includes the right to "seek" and 
"receive" information. Therefore in the context of commercial expression, the 
right of consumers to be fully informed about goods and services is expressly 
protected, in addition to the commercial speaker's right to "impart" the 
information. 
103 See Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48. 
104 See Ford v Quebec, above n 4. 
105 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
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As already mentioned, section 29 of the BORA expressly recognises that 
the BORA provisions apply "for the benefit of all legal persons as well as for the 
benefit of all natural persons". Thus, commercial entities can legitimately invoke 
their rights to freedom of expression. 
However, rights and freedoms are not absolute and section 5 of the BORA 
expressly recognises that there may be justifiable limitations on such rights and 
freedoms. Section 5 provides: 
Subject to s 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill 
of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
To determine whether a limitation is "demonstrably justified" in terms of 
section 5, a framework was developed in Moonen v Board of Film and Literature 
Review (Moonen).
106 
This framework is, in effect, a restatement of the Oakes test 
applied in Canada. First, an objective must be identified which the legislature is 
endeavouring to achieve, by the limitation. The importance and significance of 
the objective must be assessed. Secondly, there must be reasonable 
proportionality between the objective and the limitation as a "sledgehammer 
should not be used to crack a nut". 107 Thirdly, there must be a rational connection 
between the limitation and the objective. Finally, there must be as little 
interference with the right as possible. 108 
However, in any event, section 5 is subject to section 4. Therefore even if 
a limitation is not justified, section 4 requires the cou11s to nevertheless apply the 
infringing statutory provisions. Section 4 provides: 
No court shall, in re lation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or 
to be in an1 way invalid or ineffective; or 
106 
Moon en v Fi/111 and L1rera111re Board of Rel'iew [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
101 
Moonen v Film and Lt1erar11re Board of Review, above n l 06, 16. 
108 
Moonen v Fi/111 and Luerar11re Board of Review, above n 106,16-17. 
23 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
On the other hand, the courts may make a declaration or indication of 
inconsistency with the BORA. 109 Obviously, this does not have similar bite in 
comparison to the Canadian and United States' invalidations. But a declaration of 
inconsistency may bring the inconsistency to Parliament's attention and may have 
moral authority. There is no known instance where such a declaration or 
indication has been given. Therefore the remedy is far from developed, and its 
significance and impact will tum on Parliament's response to a declaration of 
. . I 10 mcons1stency. 
Many BORA cases have more reliance on section 6. Section 6 of BORA 
provides that: 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
The Canadian Chat1er does not contain a provision similar to section 6 of 
the BORA. It is unnecessary because if a provision is not justified it can simply 
be invalidated. However, it is significant in the New Zealand context because if a 
BORA consistent interpretation is available and applied then it may affect the 
result of the case. Whereas a finding of a limitation being merely unjustified 
under section 5 may not affect the result of the case due to section 4. 
An approach towards the application of sections 4, 5 and 6 was discussed 
in Moonen. First, it is necessary to identify all the different interpretations of the 
words of the limiting provision that are properly open. Secondly, the meaning 
which constitutes the least possible limitation on the right is adopted. Thirdly, the 
extent to which the meaning limits the relevant right is identified. Fourthly, it is 
109 Moonen "Film and Literature Board of Review, above n I 06. 
110 Rishworth, above n 102,837. 
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necessary to consider whether any limitations are "demonstrably justified". 
Finally, if not justified, then the provision must still stand by dint of section 4. 
The Moonen test applies section 6 before section 5. However, it is noted 
that this test is not a determinative approach towards the application of sections 4, 
5 and 6, but is merely only one possible approach. 111 There is a danger that if 
section 6 was applied first then, so long as a consistent BORA interpretation is 
tenable, then the court may not proceed with a section 5 analysis to see if the 
limitation generally, is not justified. Therefore parties may on a case-by-case 
basis interpret certain words in their favour and perhaps succeed in individual 
cases. Yet, a wide-reaching limitation on commercial expression may remam 
intact and thus continue to be detrimental in the Jong-term. 11 2 
An alternative approach towards sections 4, 5 and 6 was discussed in 
Hopkinson v Police. 113 First, does the relevant conduct fall within the natural 
meaning of the relevant statutory provision? Secondly, is the prohibition of that 
conduct prima facie inconsistent with the BORA? If so, is it a justified limitation 
by virtue of section 5? lf not, then can the section be read consistently with the 
BORA by virtue of section 6? If so, then it should be read in that way. If not, 
then section 4 applies regardless, and the statutory provision must be applied. 114 
This approach wi II serve to better protect freedom of commercial 
expression as it will first force consideration of the justifications for the statutory 
restrictions, before reliance on section 6. Therefore a court may declare the 
overall provision inconsistent with the BORA, yet then continue on to prefer a 
BORA consistent interpretation, if available, of the statutory provision. 
111 Moon en v Fi/111 and Litl.'ml11re Board of Review (No 2) (2002] 2 NZLR 754, 760 (CA). 
112 For example, see Direcwr General of Health v Rot/1111a11s of Pall Mall [ 1996) DCR 353, 
discussed later in this paper. The sec tion 6 argument turned on whether a price notice could be 
given a certain interpretation. The Court decided that the interpretation contended for was a 
"s trained interpretation". l lowever, had the Court accepted the interpretation, Rothmans of Pall 
Mall may have avoided liabil1ty by virtue of section 6. Yet, the comprehensive ban on tobacco 
products is still kept intact 111 sec tion 22 of the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. Thus, 
although Rothmans of Pall Mall may get a decision in their favour, ultimately their freedom of 
expression, along with other tobacco companies continues to be infringed. 
113 Hopkinson v Police [200..i J J ZLR 704 (HC) . 
114 Hopkinson v Police, above n 113, 709. 
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It is important to remember that the government 115 has the burden of 
justifying that limits imposed are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. This must be established on a balance of probabilities.
116 
IX CASE LAW 
There 1s no real rigorous consideration of freedom of commercial 
expression m New Zealand. Nonetheless, the courts have referred, albeit in 
passing, to freedom of expression in a few cases where commercial expression 
has or potentially has been implicated. 
A Hosking v Runting117 
This case, does not concern what can be termed "commercial expression" 
but concerns expression motivated by commercial motive, which is outside the 
scope of this paper. However, this case is significant as it provides Court of 
Appeal statements on commercial expression in general. 
This is a privacy law case where the appellants, submitted that speech of a 
"commercially motivated gossip nature" should receive lesser protection. 118 
Interestingly, they relied on Virginia Pharmacy as authority for such a 
proposition. It appears that the appellants misunderstood Virginia Pharmacy's 
position on commercial expression. It was a landmark case that afforded 
commercial speech protection, albeit lesser protection than political and artistic 
speech. But more significantly, as mentioned earlier, it limited commercial 
speech to speech that "does no more than propose a commercial transaction"' 19 
seeking solely to promote a sale of a good or service. 120 The expression 
concerned in Hosking v Runting was the publication of a photograph accompanied 
115 Typical! y it will be the government. However, under section 3 of the BORA, it could also be a 
person or body performing a public function. 
116 R v Oakes, above n 74, followed in New Zealand decisions. See Ministry of Transport v Noort 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
117 Hosking "R1111ti11g [2005] l NZLR l (CA). 
118 Hosking, , R1111ti11g. above n 117, 35 Gault P. 
119 Virginia Phannacy, above n 2, 762. 
120 See Part V A 2 Speech that does 110 more than propose a co111111ercial transaction. 
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with an article, and m any event, would not have satisfied the definition for 
commercial speech. 
Of more significance is Gault P's statement on categories of speech: 
121 
We do not think it is helpful in an area like this for the Court to adopt categories 
such as "commercial" and "non-commercial" speech. Instead we prefer an 
approach that takes into account in each individual case community norms, 
values and standards. 
Gault P refers to "an area like this" which may suggest the statement is 
limited to the area of privacy law. However, an alternative view could be that this 
is a statement of general application. It might suggest that New Zealand courts 
may be reluctant to draw distinctions between "commercial" and "non-
commercial" in commercial expression cases and opt for a more flexible approach 
similar to Canada. 
In a separate judgment, Tipping J observed that "the right to freedom of 
expression is sometimes cynically invoked in aid of commercial advantage".
122 
Although this statement is undoubtedly true in some circumstances, it must not be 
forgotten that "profit-motive" cannot be a reason to justify restrictions on 
commercial expression.
123 Tipping J then goes on to accept that "the right to 
freedom of expression exists in the commercial field".
124 
B PC Direct v Best Bu/
25 
This case was an application for an interlocutory application which 
concerned comparative advertising. Best Buy placed newspaper advertisements 
comparing its computer products directly with PC Direct's computer products. 
Elias J found there was a "serious question to be tried" and the establishment of a 
121 Hosking v Runting, above n 117, 36 Gault P. 
122 Hosking v Run ting, above n 117, 62 Tipping J. 
123 RJR-MacDona/d v Canada, above n 15 ,348 McLachlin J. 
124 Hosking v Runting, above n 117, 62 Tipping J. Although he warns that the legitimate 
commercial objective should not have a substantial adverse impact on privacy. 
125 PC Direct Ltd v Best Buy Ltd [ 19971 I ZLR 723 (HC). 
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"strong prima facie case" for a finding of trademark infringement. 
126 
Notwithstanding this, she declined the application for an injunction due to a 
concern not to "cut across the rights to freedom of speech and to receive 
information protected bys 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990".
127 
Further, earlier in the judgment, she observed that "for the purposes of 
comparative advertising, a registered proprietor whose trading name incorporates 
a trademark would be protected to an extent not available to traders who operate 
under names not registered as trademarks". 
128 Therefore identification of the 
trading name for comment would be almost impossible and constitute a 
significant fetter upon freedom of expression.
129 
The BORA was implicated in two distinct ways. First, the overall result, 
in declining the application, was because freedom of expression was important 
and as injunctions are discretionary, they should not be issued where damages are 
appropriate. Secondly, the BORA was used in questioning the comparative 
advertising itself. However, this issue was not to be resolved in the interlocutory 
proceeding. It is worth mentioning that PC Direct v Best Buy (PC Direct) was 
decided under the Trade Marks Act 1953. The new Trade Marks Act 2002 
expressly provides that there is no infringement for comparative advertising of a 
registered trade mark. 130 This new provision serves to promote freedom of 
commercial expression. 
PC Direct does not mention "freedom of commercial expression" or give 
any analysis into commercial expression. Yet, the expression concerned is 
advertising for a product and clearly constitutes commercial expression. The lack 
of any analysis does not do "freedom of commercial expression" any justice, 
especially if PC Direct is in effect an authority for freedom of commercial 
expression in New Zealand. 
126 PC Direct v Best Buy, above n 125, 733. 
127 PC Direct v Best Buy, above n 125,733. 
128 PC Direct v Best Buy, above n 125, 730. 
129 PC Direct v Best Buy, above n 125, 730. 
130 Trade Marks Act 2002, s 94. 
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Perhaps the lack of in-depth analysis was due to the case being an 
interlocutory application. Nevertheless the Court could have mentioned how 
important commercial expression was and examined the values underlying 
freedom of commercial expression. If it unde11ook a section 5 analysis, there may 
have been a difficulty in coming up with a legitimate objective which the 
restriction served to protect. Protecting the use of competitors' trademarks for 
purposes of passing off may constitute a legitimate purpose of protecting the 
dilution of a trademark or protecting consumers.
131 However, where a trademark 
is used for comparative advertising purposes and not for passing off, the 
restriction seems to result in promoting anti-competition which is hardly a basis 
for finding a legitimate objective. 
132 Thus, falling down at the first hurdle, it 
would have followed that the limitation was not justified. 
PC Direct was referred to in McCann-Erickson v Television New 
Zealand. 133 This case concerned the commercial use of video footage of Prince 
William and a "Buzzy Bee" toy. Regulations existed in New Zealand restricting 
the commercial use of royal photographs. 
134 Counsel submitted that the 
regulations must be given a possible meaning that is consistent with the BORA,
135 
and that the right to freedom of expression has been applied to advertising
136, 
citing PC Direct. However, the BORA submission was not central to the issue to 
be determined in the case and the High Cou11 did not make any statements on the 
BORA. What can be drawn from McCann-Erickson v Television New Zealand is 
that PC Direct may well be authority for commercial expression as counsel 
attempted to apply it as support for their submissions. Further, it demonstrates 
that legal counsel are presenting arguments for protection of commercial 
expression which in tum, forces the judiciary to consider such issues, albeit not 
necessarily ruling decisively on such issues. 
131 See generally: Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay Intellectual Property in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 399-513. which provides a chapter on trademarks. 
132 Section 94 in the Trade Marks Act 2004 was enacted to address this issue. 
133 McCann-Erickson v Television New Zealand (2000) 15 PRNZ 202 (HC). 
134 Commercial Use of Royal Photographs Rules 1955; Commercial Use of Royal Photographs 
Rules 1959; Commercial Use of Royal Photographs Rules 1962. These are regulations made 
under the Royal Prerogative and issued in New Zealand. 
135 McCann-Erickson v Television New Zealand, above n 133,206. 
136 McCann-Erickson v Television New Zealand, above n 133,206. 
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C Director-General of Health v Rothmans of Pall Mall137 
Director-General of Health v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Rothmans) is the 
most definitive authority in New Zealand for "freedom of commercial 
expression" . Yet such a status does not have much bearing. It may be the most 
comprehensive case that looks into commercial expression in New Zealand. 
However, by comparison to cases in Canada and United States, it is hardly strong 
authority for freedom of commercial expression. 
First, it is only a District Court decision, and thus does not carry much 
weight. Secondly, although it recognises that Rothmans of Pall Mall has a "right 
to free commercial expression", 138 it barely gives effect to such a right. 
Rothmans of Pall Mall was charged with breaching section 22 of the 
Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. 139 Section 22 provides that: 140 
No person shall publish, or arrange for any other person to publish, any tobacco 
product advertisement in New Zealand. 
Section 2 gives an exhaustive definition of "tobacco product 
advertisement". In effect, virtually all advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship of tobacco products was banned. A se1ies of technical 
exceptions were provided for mediums that originated outside of New 
Zealand; tobacco products in vaiious forms of art; and manufacturer price 
lists to retailers. 141 Another exception was a "point-of-sale" exception in 
section 23(l)(b), thus a retailer may display, 142 
[I]nside the retail er·s place of business, any notice identifying the tobacco 
products that are avail able fo r purchase in that place and indicating their price. 
137 Director-General of Health v Roth111a11s of Pall Mall [l 996] DCR 353. 
138 Director-General of Health ,, Rorh111a11s of Pall Mall, above n 137, 11. 
139 Interestingly, both the Smo ke-free Environments Act 1990 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
received its Royal Assent o n 28 August 1990. The Smoke-Free Environments Act was number 
108 and the Bill of Rights Act was no 109. Therefore, there wa never any legal possibility for a 
section 7 report. 
140 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, s 22(1). 
14 1 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, s 22(2)-(5 ). 
142 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, s 23 (l )(b). 
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Rothmans of Pal I Mall relied on section 23(1 )(b) and argued that the 
advertisement displayed in a dairy, constituted a price notice. 
Rothmans can be given some credit as it refers to RJR-MacDonald, the 
landmark decision in Canada with respect to commercial expression. Rothmans 
observes that "Canadian analysis can have its place" as it "underscores the need 
under s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to be aware of the need for 
proportion between ends and means".
143 
However, the Court goes on to merely apply section 6 of the BORA and 
concludes that the meaning which the defendant was contending was a "strained 
interpretation" 144 of section 23(l)(b) of the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. 
The Court fails to apply any section 5 analysis to determine if the provisions of 
the Smoke-free Environments Act are justified limitations on the right to freedom 
of commercial expression. Therefore its reference to RJR-MacDonald was a 
hollow reference. The Court failed to implement the framework applied in RJR-
MacDonald or any in-depth analysis of the relevant restrictions. Of course, the 
Court is still free to depart from the result in RJR-MacDonald, but it should do so 
only after examining whether such restrictions support a legitimate objective, are 
rationally connected to the objective, are of minimal impairment and are 
proportional between the ends and the means.
145 
The Court observed that the ban on publication of advertisements was "far 
from absolute". 146 The Court believed that the existence of exceptions in sections 
22(2)-(5) and 23(l)(b) supported this contention. Technically, due to such 
exceptions it may not constitute an "absolute" ban. Yet in substance the ban is 
extremely far-reaching and comprehensive, and thus the finding that such a ban 
was "far from" absolute is simply erroneous. Point of sale notices barely give 
effect to Rothmans of Pall Mall's freedom of commercial expression. Moreover, 
in RJR-MacDonald, the relevant Canadian Act had similar point-of-sale 
143 Director-General of Heal//1 v Rothmans of Pall Mall , above n l 37, 10. 
144 Ministry of Transport v Noort. above n 116. 
145 R v Oakes, above n 74, the Oakes test has been adopted in New Zealand. See Moonen v Film 
and Literature Board of RePiell', above n 106. However, note Moon en was decided after 
Director-General of Health ,, Rotlunans of Pall Mall. 
146 Director-General of Health, . Rotlzmans of Pall Mall , above n 137. 10. 
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exceptions 147 , yet the Supreme Court treated the ban as a "complete" ban. 
McLachlin J stated: 148 
A full prohibition would only be constitutionally acceptable under the minimal 
impairment stage of the analysis where the government can show that only a full 
prohibition will enable it to achieve its objective. Where, as here, no evidence is 
adduced to show that a partial ban would be less effective than a total ban, the 
justification ... is not established. 
The burden is on the Government to prove that a limitation was justified. 
It failed to bring any evidence that a partial ban on lifestyle advertising would not 
suffice, nor was any consideration given to other methods available to reduce 
demand for tobacco products, such as anti-smoking campaigns both through 
counter-advertising and in schools. 
The lack of any framework or in-depth analysis meant that in this case, 
freedom of commercial expression was merely given lip-service. 
D Summary of Case Law 
The above cases are the only known instances to support recognition of 
commercial expression. 149 The subject-matter in Hosking v Runting did not even 
concern "commercial expression"; PC Direct was only an interlocutory 
proceeding with a brief reference to freedom of expression; and Rothmans was a 
District Court judgment that failed to give any in-depth analysis. Thus New 
Zealand's present state of case law does not adequately address freedom of 
commercial expression. 
Furthermore, cases exist where commercial expression was potentially 
implicated without any mention of freedom of expression and the BORA. These 
147 Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C. 1988, s 5(l)(b). 
148 RJR-MacDonald v Canada, above n 15,343 McLachlin J. 
149 The cases are the only known instances to the author. Further support for this contention is that 
the leading text on the Bill of Rights Act (Rishworth, above n 102) does not mention any New 
Zealand authority at all for commercial expre sion. In addition, no other case apart from Director-
General of Health v Rothmans of Pall Mall. has cited the leading Canadian case, RJR-MacDonald 
v Canada. 
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include cases which concerned alleged misleading advertising which breached the 
Fair Trading Act 1986. 150 Another case was Mitre 10 v Benchmark Building 
Supplies, 15 1 which concerned the use of Mitre 10 advertising brochures. 
Benchmark had placed actual Mitre 10 brochures outside Benchmark's stores with 
stickers over Mitre lO's prices, stating lower prices. The claims alleged were both 
trade mark and copyright infringement. Interestingly, PC Direct was cited, and 
the High Court even issued an interim injunction, which was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal. Yet, both courts were silent as to freedom of expression. 
The lack of relevant case law could be due to the existence of the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). It is possible that many restrictions on 
advertising and breaches of such restrictions are assumed at this lower level, and 
thus do not proceed into the court system. However, the Advertising Standards 
Complaints Board (ASCB) applies the ASA's advertising Codes of Practice. 
Thus its decisions are not necessarily based on statutory provisions. Therefore it 
is questionable whether the ASA and ASCB have in fact assumed such a role in 
determining conflicts over statutory restrictions. 
X LEGISLATION 
Legislation may have an indirect effect of restricting commercial 
expression. For instance, legislation that prevents intellectual property 
infringements, does not specifically refer to advertising, but may catch advertising 
if such advertisements satisfy the requirements for inf1ingement. This was the 
case in PC Direct and Mitre JO v Benchmark Building Supplies. 
Alternatively, legislation may directly restrict commercial expression. 
There are a vast amount of statutes in New Zealand that directly restrict 
adver1ising. These include the Fair Trading Act 1986, Food Act 1981, Health Act 
1956, Medicines Act 1981, Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, Securities Act 
l )O See Co111111erce Commission,, Griffins Foods Ltd [1997] DCR 797; Co111111erce Commission v 
The Fresh Juice Company Ltd ( 1997) 6 NZB LC I 02, 393 (HC); Co111111erce Co111111issio11 v Adair & 
A nor ( 1995) 5 NZBLC l 03, 936 (CA). 
1
'
1 Mitre JO (NZ) Ltd v Benchmark Building Supplies Ltd [2004] l NZLR 26 (CA). See also Mitre 
/0 (NZ) Ltd v Benchmark Building Supplies Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 186 (HC). 
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1978, Local Government Act 2002, Adoption Act 1955, Flags, Emblems, and 
Names Protection Act 1981, and more recently the Prostitution Refo1m Act 2003. 
It is worth mentioning that most of the statutes refen-ed to above, were 
enacted prior to 1990 and therefore passed before the BORA even existed. This is 
a significant finding, as had those statutes been passed later when the BORA was 
applicable, then they may have been vetted for inconsistency with the BORA 
under section 7. Vetting for BORA consistency will be examined later in this 
paper. 
All those statutes clearly infringe freedom of commercial express10n, 
protected by section 14 of the BORA. Nevertheless, they may be justified 
restrictions in terms of section 5 of the BORA. Yet, to dete1mine whether a 
restriction is justified, a case must be brought to the courts, in order for the courts 
to make that determination. Herein lies a predicament: there is an overwhelming 
absence of such cases to date. Thus many restrictions continue to be law, yet may 
not be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Yet, there exists an additional bamer. Even if cases were brought, and the 
courts decided that certain statutory restrictions were not justified, such 
restrictions still stand by virtue of section 4. As already mentioned, the BORA is 
not supreme law and the courts in New Zealand, in contrast to the Canadian and 
United States courts , cannot invalidate legislation . Could this be a reason why 
commercial entities are not challenging such rest1ictions through the court 
system? It is possible that commercial entities do not want to go through the 
expense of litigation , only to get judgment, with no real remedy. However, there 
is still the possibility of a declaration or indication of inconsistency with the 
BORA.152 
Section 6 may mean that commercial entities can obtain decisions in their 
favour on a case-by-case basis . But the statutory restriction may still be wide-
152 Moonen v Fil111 and Literature Board of Review, above n 106. 
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reaching and comprehensive in other respects. Thus ultimately freedom of 
commercial expression is not protected. 
To examine all the statutes that restrict commercial expression would be a 
lengthy task. A brief examination of two legislative restrictions on commercial 
expression is provided. What is impo11ant is that, in the future, if any statutory 
provisions are infringed then a section 5 analysis should be applied to determine 
whether such statutory restrictions are demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
A Health Claims 
In New Zealand, the regulation of food is a joint effort between Food 
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ)
153 and the New Zealand Food Safety 
Authority. FSANZ produced the "Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code" 
(Food Code). 154 The Food Code heavily regulates, amongst other things, 
commercial expression that relates to food. 
One current issue is the ability of advertisers to make health claims in 
relation to food. 155 At present, except for a few permitted exceptions, it is 
generally illegal to advertise the health benefits of nutritious food.
156 On the one 
hand, there is a fear that advertisers would misuse the terms such as "healthy" and 
cause harm to consumers. However, the ASA's Code for Advertising of Food and 
general legislation such as the Fair Trading Act 1986, should adequately deal with 
any misleading health claims. Therefore, is there truly a sufficiently legitimate 
and significant objective that a restriction on health claims serves to promote? It 
appears that restrictions on health claims serves to be detrimental to health, as 
153 FSANZ is a bi-national independent statutory authority that develops joint food standards for 
Australia and New Zealand. See Food Standards Australia ew Zealand 
<http://www.foodstandards.gov.au> (last accessed 25 September 2005). FSANZ was established 
by an Australian statute the Food Standards Australia ew Zealand Act 1991. 
154 The code is incorporated into New Zealand law through the "New Zealand (Australia New 
Zealand Food Standards Code) Food Standards 2002". The Minister for Food Safety, issued the 
standard , under section 11 c of the Food Act 1981. 
155 See Glen Wiggs "Why An Apple A Day Should ot Be Illegal Advertising" at New Zealand 
Televisions Broadcasters' Council <http://www.nztbc .co.nz> (last accessed 30 July 2005) . 
156 Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code 2001 , Standard l. lA.2. 
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consumers cannot be informed about the nut1itional benefits of advertised foods. 
Currently FSANZ is considering proposals 157 for reform which will allow 
nutritional and health claims to be made for nutritious food. This will be a 
triumph for freedom of commercial expression. 
B Commercial Sexual Services 
The Prostitution Reform Act 2003 made prostitution legal in New 
Zealand. However, it imposed severe restiictions on advertising for commercial 
sexual services. Commercial sexual services may not be broadcast on radio or 
television, published in a newspaper or periodical, or screened at a public 
cinema. 158 Further, the Act delegates the power to make bylaws controlling 
signage advertising commercial sexual services. 159 There is an exception in that 
advertisements for such services may be published in a classified section of a 
newspaper or periodical. 160 
Perhaps the restrictions on advertising were a compromise m order to 
allow for the legalisation of prostitution. Nevertheless, prostitution is a legal 
service now and the restrictions are effectively very comprehensive and wide-
reaching. The objective appears to be to minimise general demand for 
commercial sexual services and perhaps uphold community standards. However, 
on closer analysis the restrictions may serve to have arbitrary effects. For 
instance, it is odd that an advertisement may legitimately appear in a community 
newspaper, such as in The Wellingtonian, yet is prohibited from airing on an adult 
entertainment channels 161 . In the latter medium, the audience may be far more 
likely to utilise such services than the community at large in the former medium. 
Therefore the restrictions may not be rationally connected nor proportionate. 
Perhaps a code could be established by the ASA that provides aspirational type 
157 Food Standards Australia New Zealand "Proposal 293: Nutrition, Health and Related Claims" 
(Initial Assessment Report, 11 Augu t 2004). See Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
<http://www.foodstandards.gov.au > (last accessed 25 September 2005). 
1
'
8 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s 11. 
1
'
9 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s 12. 
160 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s I l(b) . 
161 See Sky Television <http://www.skytv.co.nz> (last accessed 25 September 2005). Playboy TV, 
Spice and Spice 2 are pay per view adult entertainment channels that are available through Sky 
Television. 
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standards that deal with offensiveness and social responsibility, that would serve 
to promote the objective and have less arbitrary effects. 
XI ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORTING DUTY 
The Attorney-General has a duty to report to Parliament, any provisions of 
a Bill that appears to be inconsistent with the BORA. Section 7 provides that for 
a Government Bill, the report is required on introduction of the Bill, whereas in 
any other case, such as a Member Bill, the report is required as soon as practicable 
after introduction. This section 7 duty to rep01t is all the more significant given 
the absence of the courts' power to strike down legislation inconsistent with the 
BORA. Any statutory restrictions on commercial expression enacted after 1990 
could be subject to this vetting process. 
However, an Attorney-General report is not binding on Parliament. In any 
event, parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament may legislate in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the BORA. However, it must be noted that there is room 
for disagreement as to the proper interpretation of a right and whether a limitation 
is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Therefore the Attorney-General's report is not conclusive.
162 Thus if Parliament 
chooses to reject an Attorney-General's report it could be doing so either because 
it wishes to legislate in violation of the BORA, or alternatively, it could be 
rejecting the report because Parliament believes that the Attorney-General's 
opinion is incorrect in finding an inconsistency with the BORA. 
Nevertheless, there is a notion that a report will dissuade Parliament from 
acting inconsistently with the BORA. 163 Moreover, a consequence of this 
reporting duty is the fonnalisation of the BORA in the policy development 
process. 164 The Cabinet Manual requires Ministers to confirm compliance with 
the BORA, and identify aspects to proposals that may implicate the BORA.
165 
162 Rishworth, above n 102, 196. 
163 Rishworth, above n 102, 195. 
16
~ Rishworth, above n 102. 196. 
165 Cabinet Office Cabinet Ma1111al 2001 (Wellington, 2001) para 5.35 . 
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The Ministry of Justice usually provides advice to the Attorney-General on 
the consistency of Bills with the BORA. 166 To date, there has been one Attorney-
General report 167 that concerns commercial expression. This was a report on the 
Sale of Liquor (Health Warnings) Amendment Bill 2000. There have been 
various other instances 168 where the Ministry of Justice has provided advice, 
which has not resulted in a section 7 report. 
A Report on the Sale of Liquor (Health Warnings) Amendment Bill 2000 
This is the only report that has concerned commercial expression. The 
Attorney-General Margaret Wilson observed that: 169 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held on a number of occasions that 
"commercial expression" or advertisi ng is protected by the guarantee of freedom 
of expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The High Court 
appears to have also accepted this proposition. 
The former proposition is correct. The latter proposition was supported 
with a citation to Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand. 170 I question whether 
citing this authority is correct as the case did not even concern commercial 
expression. Rather, it concerned contempt of court and had no more than a 
passing reference to a Canadian case that concerned commercial expression. A 
better authority would have been PC Direct or Rothmans. 
166 If the Bill concerned is developed by the Ministry of Justice, then the Crown Law Office 
advises the Attorney-General. See Ministry of Justice <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 
25 September 2005). 
167 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Sale of 
Liquor (Health Warnings) Amendment Bill 2000 (5 September 2000). 
16 See Ministry of Justice "Legal Advice on Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990: Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill" (1 December 2003); Ministry of Justice 
"Legal Advice on Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Misuse of Drugs 
Amendment Bill (No3) SOP" (270ctober 2004); Ministry of Justice "Legal Advice on 
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Overseas Investment Bill" ( l 
November 2004); Ministry of Justice "Legal Advice on Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990: Sale of Liquor (Youth Alcohol Harm Reduction) Amendment Bill" ( 10 May 
2005). 
169 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Sale of 
Liquor (l lealth Warnings) Amendment Bill 2000 (5 September 2000) 2. 
170 S0/ici10r-Ce11eral v Radio New Zealand, above n 103. 
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The Bill did not concern the restriction of commercial expression. 
Conversely, it forced commercial expression to be expressed in the form of health 
warnings on liquor container . The warnings were to be attributed to the Ministry 
of Health and provide: 
(l) Women should not drink liquor during pregnancy because of the risk of 
birth defects. 
(2) Consumption of liquor impairs your ability to drive a car or operate 
machinery and may cause health problems. 
The Attorney-General termed such expression as "compelled expression". 
As support, she stated that Canadian case law had held that "the right to freedom 
of expression carries with it a corresponding right not to be compelled to say 
certain things". She acknowledged that there is no case law in New Zealand on 
"compelled expression", but considers that the position in New Zealand is the 
same as Canada. Thus she considered that the health warnings constituted a prima 
facie breach of freedom of expression. 
Then she considered whether the limitation was reasonable and justified in 
terms of section 5 of the BORA as applied in Moonen. 
171 The legitimate objective 
was to "educate those purchasing liquor about the possible risks of drinking". 
This was accepted to be an important objective and justi Fies "some" limits of 
freedom of expression. 
The measure was believed to be rationally connected, yet may not be 
proportionate. She considered that the warnings stated the po sible risks more 
strongly than evidence suggests was warranted, such as the reference to "health 
problems" did not reflect evidence "which suggests that alcohol-related health 
problems generally result from excessive consumption" in comparison to mere 
consumption. Nor did it reflect the health benefits of moderate consumption for 
some types of alcohol, such as red wine. Additionally, the proposed warnings 
were believed to have an overly broad application, as requirements applied even 
171 Moo11.e11 v Film and Literature Board of Review, above n 106. 
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for liquor containers where ultimately the labels would not be seen by consumers, 
such as for kegs sold for tap beer. 
A health warning was also challenged in RJR-MacDonald. However, the 
distinction was that in Canada, the Tobacco Products Control Act 1988 required 
unatt1ibuted warnings. 172 McLachlin J held that the Government had not proved 
that attributed warnings would not suffice. Thus unattributed health warnings, 
together with a prohibition against manufacturers responding with messages of 
their own, were more than minimal impairment. 
173 
The Attorney-General in this case, recognises that the warnings are 
attributed to the Ministry of Health, and acknowledges that this "may be seen as 
mitigating the extent to which the message impairs the right to freedom of 
expression". She also expressly recognises the view of the Supreme Court of 
Canada that "commercial expression may be easier to justify than other 
infringements of freedom of expression". 174 Nevertheless, she held that it was 
"not clear" that the warnings were necessarily proportionate to the objective of the 
Bill. She considered that she should "err on the side of caution" and thus 
proceeded with a section 7 repo1t of inconsistency. 
The Canadian Courts appeared to be prepared to accept attributed 
warnings. Therefore the Attorney-General went even further in protecting 
freedom of commercial expression than the Supreme Court of Canada. Although 
this is undoubtedly a triumph for freedom of commercial expression, it may not 
have been the better result. If the Attorney-General is to apply Canadian law as 
support for the concept of "compelled expression", she should similarly recognise 
the approach towards attributed warnings. It is well-established that freedom of 
expression is not absolute. 
172 Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C. 1988, s 9. 
173 RJR-MacDonald v Canada, above n 15, 348-9 McLachlin J. 
174 See RJR-MacDonald 1• Canada, above n 15,348 McLachlin J. 
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There has been further criticism of this Attorney-General report. It has 
been argued that: 175 
[T]here is a significant distinction between compelling an act of expression and 
requiring that a person provide information pursuant to an otherwise legitimate 
state regulatory purpose: the former is at the heart of the right, while the latter 
has little to do with it. 
The failure to recognise this distinction resulted in this section 7 report. It 
1s even more problematic when the proposed warnings contained factual 
information and were attributed to the Ministry of Health. It is argued that even if 
it was assumed that freedom of expression was infringed, it is "difficult to see 
how such an infringement could not have been justified".
176 
Further, it has been criticised that the medical evidence used as support 
was incomplete and the Ministry of Justice had acknowledged that it was a 
marginal call to advise that the Bill was not justified. It is argued that "erring on 
the side of caution" may diminish the seriousness of the reporting duty, and that 
the Attorney-General should not report under section 7 unless it is "clearly" 
inconsistent with the BORA. 
177 The Bill was subsequently defeated at first 
d
. 178 
rea mg. 
Clearly, there are problems as to the application of the concept of 
"compelled expression" to product labelling regimes. However, it is not the focus 
of this paper to address these issues. For our purposes, this report is significant 
for its recognition of freedom of commercial expression. The Attorney-General, 
albeit being criticised for her conclusion, must be commended for her recognition 
of freedom of commercial expression. This report demonstrates that provisions of 
Bills that potentially inf1inge freedom of commercial expression, may not be 
justified, and if so, will be drawn to the attention of the House of Representatives. 
175 Rishworth , above n 102, 333 . 
176 Rishworth, above n 102, 334. 
177 Rishworth , above n 102, 215. 
178 (11 October 2000) 588 ZPD 6089. 
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It will then be a conscious decision to legislate against a freedom guaranteed by 
the BORA. 
B Sale of Liquor (Youth Alcohol Harm Reduction) Amendment Bill 2005 
The Ministry of Justice advised the Attorney-General on the Sale of 
Liquor (Youth Alcohol Haim Reduction) Amendment Bill 2005. One amendment 
that the Bill proposed concerned inserting a new part into the Sale of Liquor Act 
1989 restricting broadcasting of liquor advertising to after 10:00 pm on any day. 
It also sought to give the Broadcasting Standards Auth01ity "sole jurisdiction" 
over all matters that may arise relating to liquor advertising. Currently, liquor 
adve1tising is already heavily regulated under the jurisdiction of the ASA and its 
Code for Advertising Liquor. 179 
The Ministry conectly recognised that section 14 "extends to commercial 
speech (such as advertising)". It also correctly recognised that limitations on 
commercial expression may be "easier to justify". However, it was wrong in 
suggesting that overseas case law considered commercial expression resided 
"within the periphery of the tight" of freedom of expression. United States and 
Canadian case law may provide that commercial expression is less important than 
some other forms of expression, such as political. 180 Yet it is another thing to say 
that commercial expression is at the borderline. Quite the contrary, as earlier 
examined, a majority of the commercial expression cases in both United States 
and Canada, have been decided in favour of freedom of commercial expression. 181 
Moreover, the value of commercial expression has been expressed in various 
cases already mentioned. 182 
Expression that comes within the "periphery of the right" should be 
reserved for expression such as hate speech, pornography, gossip, and the like. 
179 ASA Code for Advertising Liquor ( l September 2003). 
180 See Part V Defining Commercial £.\pression, which explains that the United States subjects 
commercial speech to intermediate scrutiny. See also Part VB S11111111ary of Definitions, which 
explains that restrictions on commercial expression are easier to justify in Canada. 
181 See Part VIC Comparing Approaches, which reveals that the rate of restrictions on commercial 
expression being invalidated is quite high in both Canada and the United States. 
182 See Virginia Pharmacy, above n 2. See also Ford v Quebec, above n 4. 
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To equate commercial expression to those forms of expression ignores 
commercial ex press ion's inherent value. It appears that this mistaken attitude of 
the Ministry may have negatively influenced the subsequent BORA analysis, 
which led to advice that the Bill was consistent with BORA. 
The Ministry considered that the purpose of the restriction was to "limit 
the exposure of young persons to alcohol advertising, thereby reducing their 
consumption of alcohol". This was considered to be a sufficiently important and 
significant objective. 
The Ministry then determined that the restriction was a proportionate 
response as it impacted only on broadcasting and the liquor industry was still able 
to advertise through other mediums, such as billboards and newspapers. 
Yet, the Bill significantly changes the way liquor advertising is regulated. 
It transfers jurisdiction over such issues from the ASA to the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. Surely the ASA would be the ideal body to consider issues 
dealing with liquor advertising as they have the experience of dealing with 
advertising issues and can come to a workable result in balancing the interests of 
the advertising industry and the general public. The Broadcasting Standards 
Authority is inexperienced in dealing with advertising disputes.
183 
More significantly it reduces the period of permissible liquor advertising 
from nine and a half hours to just two hours under clause 184C(l). Current 
restrictions on advertising include that liquor advertisements must not be shown 
between 6:00 am and 8:30 pm. 18
4 Furthermore, the Code for Advertising Liquor 
provides for further rules and guidelines that further restrict how liquor 
consumption is portrayed and how much time may be allocated to liquor 
advertising in any given hour. The Code for Advertising Liquor already provides 
for a "reasonable limitation on the right to freedom of expression", which the 
183 See Broadcasting Act 1989, s 21(3), which provides that the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
has no function in relation to adverti ing programmes, except where neither the broadcaster nor the 
advertiser recognise the jurisdiction of the Advertising Standard Complaints Board. 
184 ASA Code for Advertising Liquor, principle 4. 
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Ministry expressly acknowledged. Therefore surely further changes would be 
disproportionate. 
Furthermore, the Ministry failed to do any analysis as to whether the 
restriction was rationally connected. It does not appear in the advice, that any 
evidence was brought forward to justify that limiting the period available for 
liquor advertising to the hours between 10:00 pm and midnight, would actually 
decrease consumption of youths. In particular, it seems extremely arbitrary to 
disallow liquor advertising between the hours of 12:00 am and 6:00 am. Why 
would the chances of youths being exposed to liquor advertising be higher during 
the 12:00 am to 6:00 am period as opposed to the 10:00 pm and 12:00 am period? 
Furthermore, there is no evidence brought forward that liquor consumption 
increases due to the liquor advertising and not due to social culture. Liquor 
advertising may serve to inform consumers about the brands and types of liquor 
available. Even with a restriction on advertising, youth consumption of liquor 
may stay the same due to the culture of drinking. Therefore perhaps the 
restriction is not rational 1 y connected at all. On the other hand altemati ves such 
as educational programmes in schools, and counter-advertisements may serve to 
promote the objective more effectively. The problem is how liquor is consumed 
rather than an objection to liquor itself. Education is the answer. 185 Therefore 
rules that require advertisers to be "socially responsible" 186 are far more effective 
than arbitrary bans. 
Furthermore, there have been instances where liquor is advertised at low 
prices and distributed in student magazines and the like. These instances are more 
likely to attract higher consumption of liquor in youths than television 
advertisements for liquor, such as for Baileys. Yet the former is allowed and the 
latter heavily restricted. The result is somewhat arbitrary. 
185 "The Right to Advertise", above n 14, 8. 
186 ASA Code for Adverti ing Liquor. principle 2. 
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The restriction does not constitute minimal impairment. In effect, it nearly 
bans all broadcasting of liquor advertising, which can hardly be said to be 
minimal. 
The Ministry does undertake BORA analysis, yet, does so without 
questioning whether the evidence is to show that the legitimate objective is 
actually being met. Ultimately the Ministry's advice concluded that the Bill was 
consistent with the BORA. Therefore it logically followed that the Attorney-
General did not report. Currently the Bill has passed its first reading and awaits 
the Select Committee stage. It appears that the advice may have been flawed from 
the outset due to the mistaken attitude towards commercial expression. It would 
serve to better protect commercial expression if the section 7 vetting process 
stringently applies BORA analysis to justified limitations and insists on 
appropriate evidence to justify such limitations. 
C Shortcomings of Vetting Process 
The duty to report, under section 7, applies only to inconsistencies that 
exist at the time of first reading of a Bill and thus does not apply to any 
subsequent amendments made later in the legislative process. In effect, 
restrictions on rights and freedoms could be enacted without consideration of the 
impact on the BORA. This has already occurred in the commercial expression 
context. The Prostitution Reform Act 2003, as already mentioned, provides for a 
restriction on adve11ising of commercial sexual services in section 11. Section 11 
clearly infringes section 14 of the BORA. However, there was no section 7 report 
nor advice issued by the Ministry. The reason for this absence was because the 
provision was an amendment to the original Bill and was only inserted at the 
Committee of the Whole House stage. 
Another restriction on commercial expression recently passed was in the 
Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 2005. Section 43 of the Act, restricts the 
advertising for "restricted substances", which was inserted at the Select 
Committee stage. Without going into the intricacies of what constitutes 
"restricted substances", it is enough to mention that it covers substances deemed 
45 
to be low risk to individuals and society by the Expert Advisory Committee on 
Drugs, 187 and includes substances commonly known as "party pills". 
These two examples show that the hurdles of section 7 may be easily 
avoided by introducing provisions restricting commercial expression as 
amendments to an original Bill. 
However, it is argued that section 7 is not exhaustive of the Attorney-
General's constitutional obligations. 188 There is nothing to prevent the Attorney-
General informing the House of Representatives of a BORA inconsistency later in 
the legislative process. It merely means that there is no positive duty to do so. 
There have been instances where the Ministry has advised the Attorney-General 
on proposed Supplementary Order Papers that propose amendments. 189 
D Summary of Vetting Process 
The vetting process may be a highly useful weapon in the scheme of 
protecting rights and freedoms guaranteed by the BORA, particularly as the 
BORA is not supreme law and thus the courts cannot invalidate legislation that 
conflicts with it. It is commendable that freedom of commercial expression is 
recognised as being protected under the BORA. 
However, as noted, there are potential shortcomings. Whether or not such 
shortcomings are overstated or understated will tum on whether the Attorney-
General is proactive in bringing amendments, which are inconsistent with the 
BORA, to the attention of the House of Representatives. 
Additionally, the Ministry must endeavour to ask crucial questions that 
inquire into where the actual evidence is to show that any limitation is justified. 
Further, the Ministry must change its present attitude towards commercial 
187 
See Ministry of Justice "Legal Advice on Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990: Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill (No3) SOP" (270ctober 2004). 
188 Rish worth, above n 102, 197 . 
189 
See Ministry of Justice "Legal Advice on Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
L990: Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill (No3) SOP" (270ctober 2004). 
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express10n. It should recognise that freedom of commercial expression 1s a 
fundamental 1ight that does not reside anywhere near the "periphery" of the right. 
XII ADVERTISING STANDARDS AUTHORITY 
An analysis of freedom of commercial expression in New Zealand would 
be incomplete without mentioning the role of the ASA. The ASA has an 
instrumental role in regulating advertising. It develops various Advertising Codes 
of Practice (Codes) which provide the rules by which all advertisements in all 
media should comply. 190 The Codes are administered by the ASCB, which is the 
independent self-regulatory body established by the ASA. The ASA is a creature 
of self-regulation and is not established by statute. Its membership comprises the 
representatives of the media including newspaper and magazine publishers, 
television and radio service operators, and advertising agents. 
191 Herein lies a 
predicament: is the BORA even applicable to the ASA and the decisions of the 
ASCB? 
A Application of the Bill of Rights Act 
1 Public function 
Section 3 of the BORA provides: 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done -
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function , power or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
190 Advertising Standards Authority Annual Reporr (31 December 2004) 2. 
191 Advertising Standards Authority AdFerrising Codes of Practice (July 2005) 13. The members 
of the ASA are: Association of New Zealand Advertisers (Inc); Communication Agencies 
Association of New Zealand (Inc); Community Newspapers; Letterbox Media Association; 
Magazine Publishers' Association (Inc); Newspaper Publishers ' Association (Inc); New Zealand 
Television Broadcasters Council; New Zealand Community ewspapers Association; New 
Zealand Cinema Advertising Council; New Zealand Marketing A sociation; New Zealand Post 
Limited; Online Publishers Group; Outdoor Advertising As ociation of New Zealand; Pay 
Television Group; and Radio Broadcasters Association. 
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Clearly the ASA does not satisfy the requirements of section 3(a). 
However, it is arguable that it may meet the requirements of "public function" in 
section 3(b). The "public function" element is a determination that is already 
required in judicial review cases concerning private bodies. 
The English Court of Appeal in R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex 
parte Datafin plc (Datafin) 192 identified relevant considerations in determining 
whether a private body is performing a public function and is thus judicially 
reviewable. One significant consideration was whether "but for" the existence of 
the private body, the government would itself inevitably intervene to regulate the 
activity. 193 
These principles were readily applied in New Zealand in Electoral 
Commission v Cameron. 194 It is convenient that this decision directly concerned 
the role of the ASCB. Mr Cameron, the named defendant, was the chairman of 
the ASA at that time. It was held that the ASCB was susceptible to judicial 
review. 195 Furthermore, "there was unanimity among the parties that in 
general" 196 the decisions of the ASCB are judicially reviewable. Therefore, in any 
event, the ASCB are willingly conceding the potential for judicial review. 
In applying the considerations in Datafin, if the ASA did not regulate 
advertising, then the government would inevitably establish a statutory regulatory 
regime for the advertising industry, most likely akin to the regime that exists for 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority. 197 It is also worth mentioning that the 
regulatory role of the ASCB has had statutory recognition in the Broadcasting Act 
1989. 198 This further supports the role of performing a "public function". 
192 R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex parte Datafin pie ( Datafin) (1987] QB 815. 
193 S De Smith, Lord Woolf, and J Jowell Judicial Review of Ad111i11istrative Action (Sect, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 1995) para 3-027. 
194 Electoral Commission v Ca111ero11 [ 1997] 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
195 Electoral Co111111issio11 v Ca111ero11, above n 194, 429. 
196 Electoral Com111issio11 v Ca111ero11, above n 194, 429. 
197 The Broadcasting Standard Authority (BSA) was established by the Broadcasting Standards 
Act 1989, s 20. The functions of the BSA are provided in section 21. 
198 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 8, which provides in respect of advertising programmes, demarcation 
of the jurisdictions of the ASCB and the BSA. 
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Section 3(b) has a further requirement that "public function" must be 
"pursuant to law" . The meaning of "pursuant to law" is unclear and case law 
provides little assistance. 199 One interpretation could be that the duty must be 
imposed by the state through legi slation or perhaps the common law. 
200 
Alternatively, it could be interpreted to include duties voluntarily assumed by 
private bodies, provided the voluntary assumption occurs pursuant to legal 
rules .201 The legal rules relevant to the ASA and ASCB would be the law relating 
to incorporated bodies and contracts. 
The second interpretation is preferable, as it aligns the BORA with judicial 
review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1971 and the common law .
202 The 
critical inquiry is the "public function" aspect. It is argued that the "requirement 
of imposition pursuant to law will ... readily be met, since the law will have 
facilitated the assumption of [the public] function".
203 Therefore on this analysi s 
the BORA, and hence section 14, is applicable to the ASCB when determining 
complaints. However, Electoral Commission v Cameron, albeit ruling on whether 
judicial review was available, did not concern the application of the BORA thus is 
not direct authority on this point. It is likely that a similar approach will be 
applied to "public function " in section 3(b).
204 
2 Limits prescribed by law 
Proceeding on the basis that the BORA is applicable to the ASCB , another 
hurdle exists under section 5 of the BORA. Any limits on rights and freedom s, 
such as the Codes, must be "prescribed by law". Thus we have to determine when 
a limit is "prescribed" by law and further, what is " law" for purposes of 
authorising the relevant limit. 
199 Ri sh worth , above n I 02, 96. 
200 Ri shworth , above 11 102, 96. 
20 1 Ri sh worth , above n I 02, 96. 
202 Ri sh worth , above n I 02, 97. 
203 Rish worth , above n I 02. 97 . 
204 In Slwrtland v No rth/and Health Ltd [ 1998] 1 NZLR 433, 444 (CA) the Court o f Appeal noted 
in passing, that the issue whether the Crown-owned hospital company was subject to section 3 was 
"re lated to" the is. ue o f whether it had exercised a statutory power in terms o f the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972, as c ited in Ri sh worth , above 11 102, 90. 
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The European Court of Human Rights analysed the phrase in Sunday 
Times v United Kingclom 205 and held that the law must be both "adequately 
accessible" and must be fonnulated with "sufficient precision" to enable people to 
regulate their conduct by it. This approach has been accepted in Canada206 and 
Sunday Times has also been referred to in New Zealand. 207 The Codes are both 
accessible208 and set out with sufficient precision. The Codes clearly state the 
specific rules that members must comply with. Furthermore, it states how the 
Codes are to be interpreted.209 
It is argued that in addition to the requirements of accessibility and 
sufficient precision, the limits must have the "force of law".210 Legislation and 
regulations clearly have such "force of law". However, it is more difficult to 
determine whether the Codes have such "force of law". There is nothing 
preventing the members from withdrawing from the ASA and thus not complying 
with the Codes. On the other hand, if members voluntarily submit to the ASA and 
subsequently the ASCB's jurisdiction, then they are submitting to the Codes 
which are established pursuant to the law of incorporated bodies and contracts. 
Thus the Codes have the force of law when organisations agree to be members of 
the ASA. 
In the United Kingdom, various cases have challenged the authority of a 
similar Advertising Standards Authority in the context of freedom of commercial 
expression.211 In the United Kingdom, freedom of expression is protected through 
the Human Rights Act 1988 which enshrines the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Article 10.2 of the Convention contains a similar provision to section 5 of 
the BORA, and provides that restrictions are to be "presc1ibed by law". In 
205 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, 271 (ECHR). 
206 See Peter Hogg Consti1111io11al Law of Canada (Student ed, Carswell, Ontario, 2004) 799-80 l. 
207 Ministry o/Transporr v Noori, above n 116; Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand, above n 
103. 
208 
Advertising Standards Authority <http://www.asa.co.nz> (last accessed 25 September 2005). 
209 Advertising Standards Authority Advertising Codes of Practice (July 2005) 15. 
210 Rish worth, above n 102. 175. 
211 See R v Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, exp. Charles Robertson Ltd [2000] EMLR 463 
(QBD Admin Ct); SmithK/111e Beecham pie v Advertising Standards Authority [2001] EMLR 23 
(QBD Admin Ct). See also Richard Lawson "Challenging the Advertising Standards Authority" 
(2001) 151 New Law Journal 526. 
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SmithKline Beecham plc v Advertising Standards Authority, 212 Hunt J found the 
ASA Codes consistent with Article 10.2 and therefore by inference, must have 
accepted that the Codes were "prescribed by law". 213 New Zealand may follow a 
similar approach. 
Furthermore, it must be the correct conclusion as a matter of logic. 
Otherwise the situation would be that we accept the BORA is applicable to the 
ASCB and yet do not accept that the Codes are "prescribed by law". Thus any 
provision in the Codes or any decision made by the ASCB in accordance with the 
Codes would automatically be unreasonable despite that it might well be a 
"demonstrably justified" limit. This seems to be bordering on absurdity. 
3 Express references 
There are express BORA references in some of the Codes which provide 
further support for the contention that the BORA applies to the ASCB. For 
example, the advocacy principles expressly refer to section 14 of the BORA. The 
advocacy principles are relevant to the interpretation of rule 11 of the Code of 
Ethics, which concerns advocacy adve,tising. There is also a reference to the 
BORA in principle 1 of the Code for People in Advertising. These explicit 
references potentially colour all the Codes and thus strengthens the contention that 
ASCB should consider section 14 of the BORA when ruling on complaints. 
B Bill of Rights Act Issues 
The BORA has impact on the ASA in two ways. First, the Codes 
established by the ASA may constitute unjustified limitations on commercial 
expression. Alternatively, the decisions of the ASCB may apply the Codes in a 
manner that limits freedom of commercial expression. 
212 S111i1hK/i11e Beecham pie v Adve rtising S1a11dards Awlwrity [20011 EMLR 23 (QBD Admin Ct). 
213 Richard Lawson "Challenging the Advertising Standards Authority" (200 I) 15 I New Law 
Journal 526, 530. 
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1 The Codes 
The Codes do not replace statutory or common law, but complement the 
law.214 For example, advertising must not breach the Fair Trading Act 1986. The 
Codes include a Code of Ethics, 215 which is "the overall philosophy covering 
fairness, respect for people, and honest practice". 216 Other codes cover particular 
issues, such as advertising to children; 217 or product areas, such as financial 
services. 218 The Codes clearly restrict freedom of commercial expression as their 
whole purpose is to regulate advertising. However, they may be demonstrably 
justifiable limitations on freedom of commercial expression. 
The Codes generally provide for rules and guidelines that are aspirational 
type standards. For instance, principle 4 of the Code of Ethics provides that 
"advertisements should be prepared with a due sense of social responsibility" and 
rule 5 of the Code of Ethics provides that "advertisements should not contain 
anything which in the light of general prevailing community standards is likely to 
cause serious or widespread offence". 
In applying the Codes, the context, medium, audience and the product or 
service of the advertisement are taken into account. Advertisements are then 
challenged on the circumstances in each case. The Codes do not generally impose 
over-reaching prohibitions on advertising, but rather usually have aspirational 
standards that advertisements must meet. 
Some products and services are regulated more severely than others. For 
example, the Code for Advertising Liquor imposes time and manner rest1ictions 
that may not survive a stringent BORA section 5 analysis. 
214 Advertising Standards Authority Advertising Codes of Practice (July 2005) 15. 
215 ASA Advertising Code of Ethics (1 August 1996). 
216 Advertising Standards Authority Advertising Codes of Practice (July 2005) 15. 
217 ASA Code for Advertising to Children (1 February 2001). 
218 ASA Code for Financial Advertising (1 August 1998). 
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2 ASCB decisions 
Due to earlier analysis, it appears that the ASCB is subject to the BORA. 
In effect, this means that its decisions should be compliant with the BORA and 
consequently section 14. However, an examination of a sample of recent 
decisions of the ASCB reveals that the BORA is rarely mentioned. 
A sample of 2003 decisions concerning principle 4219 or rule 5220 of the 
Code of Ethics revealed that only in one decision 221 out of twenty 222 was the 
BORA mentioned. In this decision, the advertiser had included in his submission, 
reference to section 14 of the BORA. 223 The ASCB acknowledged "the 
importance for the Complaints Board not to fetter the freedom unless there was 
proven justification, and advised that it was well aware of its obligation in this 
respect". However, there was no BORA analysis to determine whether the 
limitation in this case was justified in terms of section 5 of the BORA. The 
complaint was upheld without any BORA analysis, despite the express 
acknowledgement that limitations must be justified. 
In 2004, a sample of decisions concerning rule 5 of the Code of Ethics, 
revealed that only one224 out of fifteen of the decisions, mentioned the BORA.225 
219 Principle 4 concerns social responsibility . 
220 Rule 5 concerns offensiveness. 
221 ASCB (14 October 2003) Decision 03/233 . 
222 10 complaints "upheld" were examined including: ASCB (11 March 2003) Decision 03/20; 
ASCB (8 April 2003) Decision 03/35; ASCB ( 15 May 2003) Decision 03/64; ASCB (8 July 2003) 
Decision 03/ 105; ASCB (8 July 2003) Decision 03/ l l 6; ASCB ( 14 October 2003) Decision 
03/233; ASCB (14 October 2003) Decision 03/237; ASCB (14 October 2003) Decision 03/243; 
ASCB (24 November 2003) Decision 03/251; ASCB ( 14 October 2003) Decision 03/253 . 10 
complaints "not upheld" were examined including: ASCB (11 March 2003) Decision 03/24; 
ASCB (8 April 2003) Decision 03/27; ASCB (8 April 2003) Decision 03/31; ASCB (8 April 2003) 
Decision 03/36; ASCB (8 April 2003) Decision 03/49; ASCB (15 May 2003) Decision 03/58; 
ASCB (15 May 2003) Decision 03/62; ASCB ( 15 May 2003) Decision 03/86; ASCB (10 June 
2003) Deci sion 03/93; ASCB (15 June 2003) Decision 03/94. 
223 In the advertiser's submission there was a reference to Glen Wigg's essay, see "The Right to 
Advertise", above n 14. 
224 ASCB ( 16 November 2004) Decision 04/362. 
225 Only five complaints were upheld, these were: ASCB (l l May 2004) Decision 04/129; ASCB 
(8 June 2004) Decision 04/162; ASCB ( 13 July 2004) Decision 04/206; ASCB ( 14 September 
2004) Decision 04/336; ASCB (16 November 200..i) Decision 04/362. A sample of ten complaints 
"not upheld'' included: ASCB (9 March 2004) Decision 04/35; ASCB (6 April 2004) Decision 
04/68; ASCB (11 May 2004) Decision 04/104 ; ASCB ( 11 May 2004) Decision 04/117; ASCB (13 
July 2004) Decision 04/124; ASCB (8 June 200..i) Decision 04/154; ASCB (8 June 2004) Decision 
VICTOR/ U 'I 'ER~ITV OF WELLINGTON 
53 
The advertiser referred to section 14 of the BORA and submitted that it was 
against the background of freedom of expression that the Codes must be 
construed. Despite this, the ASCB did not refer to the BORA at all in its 
deliberations. It did not even acknowledge that BORA even applied, let alone do 
any section 5 analysis as to whether restricting the advertisement was justified. 
The complaint was upheld. 
In 2005,226 a sample of the decisions concerning rule 5, did not result in 
any references to the BORA.227 
Furthermore, the advocacy principles explicitly refer to the BORA. As 
already mentioned, the advocacy principles are guidelines for interpretation of 
rule 11 of the Code of Ethics on advocacy advertising. 228 The 2005 decisions 
concerning rule 11, generally have explicit references to BORA.229 The ASCB 
acknowledge the principles which refer to the BORA. Yet, there is a complete 
lack of any BORA analysis. Not only is there a lack of analysis, but there does 
not appear to even be a simple statement to the effect that restricting the 
advertisement is "justified" with respect to BORA. 
Clearly, this examination 1s not determinative, as only samples of the 
decisions were examined. However, it does give some idea of how much 
emphasis the BORA is given in the decisions of the ASCB. In order to promote 
04/168; ASCB (13 July 2004) Decision 04/172; ASCB (13 July 2004) Decision 04/194; ASCB (13 
July 2004) Decision 04/211; ASCB (8 March 2005) Decision 04/450. 
226 As of 9 September 2005. 
227 Complaints "upheld" included: ASCB (12 April 2005) Decision 05/66; ASCB (14 June 2005) 
Deci ion 05/158. Complaints "not upheld" included: ASCB (8 March 2005) Decision 05/03; 
ASCB (8 March 2005) Decision 05/15; ASCB (10 May 2005) Decision 05/76; ASCB (10 May 
2005) Decision 05/98; ASCB ( 10 May 2005) Decision 05/ 106; ASCB ( 10 May 2005) Decision 
05/107; ASCB (12 July 2005) Decision 05/130; ASCB (14 June 2005) Decision 05/133; ASCB 
(14 June 2005) Decision 05/157; ASCB (14 June 2005) Decision 05/178. 
228 The advocacy guidelines explicitly require the ASCB to consider the BORA. However, 
advocacy advertising may not strictly speaking be commercial expression as it usually concerns 
political expression. Nevertheless, an examination of advocacy advertising disputes is useful to 
gain insight as to how much emphasis is given to the BORA when guidelines expressly require 
consideration of the BORA. In turn, this will give insight into how much emphasis the BORA is 
likely to be given when there are no guidelines expressly referring to the BORA, which is the case 
for the majority of the advertising rules. 
229 See decisions: ASCB (12 April 2005) Decision 05/56; ASCB (12 July 2004) Decision 05/199; 
ASCB (12 July 2005) Decision 05/205; ASCB (10 May 2005) Decision 05/75; ASCB (12 July 
2005) Decision 05/168. 
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freedom of commercial expression, the ASCB should be endeavouring to apply 
BORA analysis to their decisions. Perhaps it is some consolation that in the event 
an advertiser is aggrieved, there remains the possibility of appealing to the High 
Court for judicial review. 
Conceivably, there may be practical considerations that may inhibit an in-
depth BORA analysis that may otherwise be expected of the courts. The ASCB 
panel are not as experienced in dealing with the BORA, as they are not judges nor 
even lawyers, but mere representatives from the public and the advertising 
industry. However, guidelines may be established to assist the panel in their 
BORA analysis. 
Furthermore, one aspect of the self-regulatory system is that disputes are 
dealt with efficiently. In 2004 alone, there were 722 formal complaints, of which 
257 became substantive complaints and were adjudicated on. Imposing an in-
depth BORA analysis in each and every case, may serve to slow down the process 
and thus the system may become less efficient. 
Despite these practical considerations, the BORA is nevertheless an Act 
that protects fundamental rights and deserves some mention in the decisions of the 
ASCB. Perhaps it can be conceded that the analysis may not necessarily be to the 
same in-depth extent as that expected of the courts. However, that does not justify 
the complete absence of BORA analysis in the decisions of the ASCB to date. 
C Self-Regulation 
The ASA must ensure justice is done and ju tice is seen to be done and 
regulate commercial expression accordingly or otherwise Parliament will 
intervene. Advertisers and the media "want to preserve the right to adve1tise but 
recognise that advertising should be responsible and not encourage abuse or 
misuse".230 Therefore the advertising industry recognises that the right to freedom 
of commercial expression is not absolute and limits can be placed on advertising, 
230 Glen Wiggs "The Role and Value of Business Self-Regulation" (Unpublished, Wellington, 
1996) 5 [The Role and Value of Business Self-Regulation]. 
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provided they are reasonable restrictions. This is the key point, reasonable 
restrictions on advertising are acceptable, but arbitrary bans and unworkable laws 
are not. Legislation has a tendency to impose arbitrary bans on advertising that 
are inflexible. On the other hand, the Codes aim for socially responsible 
adve1tising on a case by case basis as oppose to outright bans on all advertising on 
a specific product or service. 
Furthermore, for self-regulation to succeed, it is argued that short-term 
gams must be sacrificed in order for the greater long-term goal. 23 1 Therefore, 
advertisers should ensure their advertising is socially responsible and not be 
misleading or offensive. This industry responsibility will instil consumer trust in 
advertising, which is imp01tant because without such trust consumers may 
disregard all advertising, which ultimately harms the advertising industry. 
There may be arguments that the ASA is impartial and would inevitably 
favour the advertising industry in its Codes and in the decisions of the ASCB. 
However, the rate in 2004 of accepted complaints232 that were upheld or settled 
was 48 per cent. Thus nearly half of the complaints accepted, resulted in favour of 
the complainants. Furthermore the Codes cover all advertising and impose some 
strict conditions on certain products and services, such as the Therapeutic 
Products Advertising Code. Given this, one may jump to the conclusion that 
perhaps the ASA is not as supportive of freedom of commercial expression as 
initially thought. However, such a conclusion ignores that freedom of commercial 
expression is not absolute. The Codes and upheld decisions may be instances 
where the limits on freedom of commercial expression are "demonstrably 
justified". 
D Pre-Vetting Systems 
Another interesting aspect relating to the ASA Codes is the pre-vetting 
administered by the Association of New Zealand Advertisers (ANZA). There are 
23 1 "The Ro le and Value o f Business Se lf- Regul ation", above n 230. 
232 Note, o nl y substantive co mpl aints are accepted fo r determination by the ASCB . Reasons for 
non-acceptance include that complaints have previously been decided , no jurisdi ction or no prima 
facie case. 
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"Pre-Vetting Systems"233 that scrutinise advertisements for compliance with the 
Codes for Therapeutic Advertising and the Code for Advertising Liquor. 
Freedom of expression is usually at odds with this idea of prior restraint. 
However, as already discussed, one aspect of commercial expression is that due to 
its profit motive, the expression is more durable. Therefore, a little delay does not 
have the same effect on advertising as it may on the reporting of cun-ent affairs. 
Such pre-vetting 1s implemented prior to the publication of the 
advertisements. However, it may be prudent for advertisers to voluntarily pre-vet 
advertisements at the "concept" stage.234 This may avoid the result of an ASCB 
decision requiring withdrawal of the advertisement. This is an advantage as 
advertisers do not want advertisements withdrawn after the large amount of funds 
invested in such advertisements. Again, due to the nature of commercial 
expression, pre-vetting does not usually adversely affect "freedom of commercial 
expression" in a substantive way. Although, this is largely dependant on how 
strict the pre-vetting system is, in that if a large majority of adve11isements are 
denied then clearly freedom of commercial expression may be adversely affected. 
E Summary of ASA 
The ASA plays a vital role in regulating commercial expression. In 2004 
alone, the ASCB dealt with 257 substantive complaints. The BORA should be 
applicable to the ASA and ASCB due to its "public function". Fu11hermore, if the 
BORA is applicable, it should logically follow that the Codes, which are both 
accessible and sufficiently precise, should satisfy the "prescribed by law" 
requirement in section 5 of the BORA. However, this does not mean that the 
Codes will always be reasonable. A provision of the Code must still be 
"demonstrably justified" in order to be a reasonable limit on freedom of 
commercial expression. 
233 See Advertising Standards Authority <http://www.asa.co.nz> (last accessed 25 September 
2005); See also Association of New Zealand Advertisers <http://www.anza.co.nz> (last accessed 
25 September 2005). 
234 The Television Commercial Approvals Bureau provides a service where concepts or scripts are 
pre-vetted for consistency with the ASA ·s Codes. See Television Commercial Approvals Bureau 
<http ://www.tvcab.co.nz> (last accessed 25 September 2005). 
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Given the nature of the ASA, in that its members are comprised of the 
advertising industry, it is highly likely that the ASA will generally promote 
freedom of commercial express10n. However, in the event that it does act in 
breach of freedom of commercial expression without justification, then its 
decisions will be reviewable by the courts. 
The Codes generally provide for aspirational standards rather than 
comprehensive wide-reaching prohibitions on advertising. This allows for 
consideration of the circumstances in each case and contextual factors to be taken 
into account. Therefore the BORA may be implicated more likely in how the 
decisions of the ASCB are decided. Yet, it appears that the decisions rarely 
mention the BORA. This is an issue that should be addressed, as it appears that 
the ASCB is subject to the BORA and without some type of section 5 BORA 
analysis, freedom of commercial expression may be unreasonably infringed. 
Perhaps in many cases, the substantive result, that is whether the complaint is 
upheld or not, may remain the same. However, a vigilant approach that refers to 
the BORA, will serve to protect freedom of commercial expression in the cases 
that are more difficult to decide. 
XIII CONCLUSION 
This paper gave a broad overview of freedom of commercial expression. 
It explored various aspects of commercial expression and reasons against and in 
support of restrictions. As observed, the United States' and Canadian courts have 
dealt extensively with commercial expression and have developed in-depth 
analysis in examining issues relating to commercial expression. New Zealand has 
already referred to Canadian authority both in case law 235 and an Attorney-
General report. 236 Thus it is likely to continue to consider Canadian autho1ity but 
may also consider United States cases where relevant. 
235 Direcror-Ce11eral of Health v Rothmans of Pall Mall, above n 137. 
236 Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Sale of 
Liquor (Health Warnings) Amendment Bill 2000 (5 September 2000). 
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Reviewing the current situation in New Zealand, it is commendable that 
there is at least some recognition of the right to freedom of commercial 
expression. However, the courts are slow to recognise the right. Further, when 
they do so, they do not adequately give in-depth analysis of the justifications for 
restricting commercial expression. 
The section 7 vetting process will be crucial to any future proposed 
restrictions on commercial expression and as observed, the Attorney-General is 
willing to recognise freedom of commercial expression. There are many statutes 
that infringe commercial expression. Yet, many were enacted prior to the BORA, 
and therefore the vetting process was not implicated. The Attorney-General may 
need to be more proactive on amendments to Bills because, as observed, various 
amendments restricting commercial expression have slipped through the cracks. 
Furthermore, when the Ministry of Justice provides advice as to BORA 
consistency, it appears that crucial questions, as to evidence, are left unanswered. 
Any future legislative restrictions on commercial expression are likely to 
be vigilantly lobbied against by the ASA, amongst other interested parties. It is 
likely the ASA's role in regulating commercial expression will be more flexible 
and appropriate to the circumstances of each case. Therefore this will result in 
protecting commercial expression generally, as broad principles will be applied in 
the context of the cases that are brought, instead of arbitrary and unworkable 
restrictions. However, the decisions of the ASCB would be improved if there are 
more explicit consideration of the BORA in future disputes. 
It is an impediment that the Supreme Court in New Zealand does not have 
similar powers to strike down legislation like its counterpart in Canada. 
Nevertheless, courts should employ a section 5 analysis to already existing 
restrictions on commercial expression passed prior to the BORA and indicate 
declarations of inconsistency when such restrictions are too arbitrary and over-
reaching that they cannot be demonstrably justified. There may at least be moral 
authority for Parliament to address such issues. The ASA can support this by 
lobbying to Parliament over both current and future unreasonable statutory 
restrictions. However, the ASA will need to cooperate with Parliament in 
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addressing reasonable restrictions on commercial expression through self-
regulation. 
By no means does this paper argue that freedom of commercial expression 
is absolute. That is simply not the case given that there are harms, as observed, 
that can occur through commercial expression. Furthermore, this paper does not 
argue that Parliament can never enact an over-reaching restriction on advertising. 
Rather, the Canadian courts have emphasised that the crucial point is: the 
government must prove that the limitation is justified and thus must bring forth 
evidence in support. The government cannot just implement a comprehensive ban 
on advertising of a product, such as liquor, simply by stating that its objective is 
too decrease liquor abuse. It needs to bring forth evidence such as that a partial 
ban, or counter-expression, or educational programmes and so forth would not be 
sufficient alternatives to address the objective. Subsequently, the courts may treat 
such evidence with a "margin of appreciation" and degree of deference. Therefore 
it has been observed that restrictions on commercial expression may be easier to 
justify as there is greater deference to Parliament in commercial expression cases 
due to policy considerations. 
New Zealand should adopt a vigilant approach to protecting freedom of 
commercial expression to align New Zealand's jurisprudence with jurisprudence 
in overseas jurisdictions. This is all the more important due to the universal 
character of fundamental rights. In doing so, New Zealand will be protecting the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression. There is nothing more to say except 
that New Zealand should - "just do it". 
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